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Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law:
How Deforestation Became an
Object of Climate Governance
William Boyd
Few areas of law are as deeply implicated with science and technology
as environmental law, yet we have only a cursory understanding of how
science and technology shape the field. Environmental law, it seems, has
lost sight of the constitutive role that science and technology play in
fashioning the problems that it targets for regulation. Too often, the study
and practice of environmental law and governance take the object of
governance-be it climate change, water pollution, biodiversity, or
deforestation-as self-evident, natural, and fully-formed without
recognizing the significant scientific and technological investments that go
into making such objects and the manner in which such investments shape
the possibilities for response. This Article seeks to broaden environmental
law's field of vision, replacing the tendency to naturalize environmental
problems with an exploration of how particular scientific and technological
knowledge practices make environmental problems into coherent objects
of governance. Such knowledge practices, or ways of seeing, are
instrumental in shaping regulatory possibilities and must be interrogated
directly as key constituents of particular forms of governance. The
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argument is developed through a case study of how tropical deforestation,
which accounts for some 15 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions but
which was expressly excluded from the Kyoto Protocol, has recently
become a viable object of climate governance, demonstrating the
fundamental importance of conceptual advances in carbon cycle research,
the synoptic view of global land cover change made possible by remote
sensing, and new carbon accounting techniques in rendering the problem
comprehensible for climate policy. Building on the case study, this Article
identifies and elaborates on three general ways of seeing- kind-making,
calculability, and equivalence- that operate through particular scientific
and technical practices to shape and inform the substance of environmental
law, with specific attention to the implications of the overall approach for a
comprehensive theory of the field.
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Tropical deforestation has emerged in recent years as an important
object of global climate governance, representing a significant departure
from past efforts to deal with the problem. Indeed, despite the fact that
both tropical deforestation and climate change have been prominent
concerns in international environmental policy for almost two decades,
[Vol. 37:843844
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until recently they have been treated largely as separate and distinct, with
only limited attention to deforestation's role in climate change.' Previous
international efforts to halt tropical deforestation have focused instead on
biodiversity loss, unsustainable consumption practices, and various legal
and institutional shortcomings in tropical forest countries (to name a
few), with minimal results in reducing deforestation on any significant
scale.2 Likewise, the international climate regime expressly excluded
emissions from tropical deforestation from the Kyoto Protocol's first
commitment period (2008-12),' creating an immense gap in international
climate policy given that tropical deforestation accounts for some 15
percent of global anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions.'
Over the last several years, however, there has been a concerted
effort to incorporate emissions from deforestation in climate governance
at multiple levels and a growing realization that climate policy may
represent the last chance to save tropical forests on any significant scale.
Traveling most often under the somewhat cumbersome moniker of
1. See infra Parts II.C and III.
2. This is evidenced by the simple fact that deforestation continues virtually unabated at
some thirteen million hectares per year. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UN, GLOBAL
FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT 2005: PROGRESS TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE FOREST
MANAGEMENT 19 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT] (reporting gross
average annual deforestation of 12.9 million hectares per year during 2000-2005).
3. See UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Decision 11/CP.7:
Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/ Add.1, 60 (Jan. 21,
2002) [hereinafter UNFCCC Land Use] (excluding avoided deforestation activities from the
Clean Development Mechanism).
4. The most recent estimates of emissions from forest loss put the contribution of
emissions from deforestation, forest degradation, and destruction of peatlands at about 15
percent of total anthropogenic CO, emissions. See G.R. van der Werf et al., CO, Emissions from
Forest Loss, 2 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 737, 738 (2009). This represents a decrease from earlier
estimates for the 1990s, which estimated that emissions from deforestation accounted for some
20 percent of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 543 (2007)
[hereinafter IPCC WG III REPORT] (reporting that emissions from deforestation in the 1990s
were 5.8 billion metric tons (5.8 Gigatonnes or Gt) of CO, per year, which is approximately 1.6
Gt of carbon per year); Raymond Gullison et al., Tropical Forests and Climate Policy, 316
SCIENCE 985, 985 (2007) (noting that "[t]ropical deforestation released -1.5 billion metric tons of
carbon to the atmosphere annually throughout the 1990s accounting for almost 20 percent of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions"). Part of the explanation is that the overall
contribution of emissions from deforestation has declined as fossil fuel emissions have continued
to grow and deforestation has decreased slightly. See Corinne Le Qu6r6 et al., Trends in the
Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide, 2 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 831, 832 (2009) ("The relative
contribution of LUC [Land Use Change] CO, emissions to total anthropogenic CO, emissions
decreased from 20 percent in 1990-2000 to 12 percent in 2008 owing to increasing fossil fuel
emissions and below-average deforestation emissions in 2008."). Le Qudr6 et al. attribute the
below-average LUC emissions for 2008 (declining from 1.5 billion metric tons of carbon per year
to 1.2 billion metric tons) to wet La Nifia conditions that "probably limited fire and deforestation
rates in southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia" and the continuation of a decline in
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Id.
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Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
(REDD), these efforts have effectively reframed the issue from one
focused on forests as carbon sinks-the dominant framing during the
Kyoto Protocol discussions-to one focused on the forest sector as a
source of emissions, thereby putting the problem in the same regulatory
lexicon as fossil fuel emissions and smoothing the way for an integration
into climate policy.' The result of these efforts is apparent in the
considerable traction that the issue has garnered in the international
negotiations regarding a post-2 012 climate treaty, in the design of
greenhouse gas (GHG) compliance systems in the United States and
elsewhere, and in efforts to reorient forest law and governance in key
tropical forest countries.'
There are multiple explanations for this shift -political, institutional,
scientific, and technological -and there is no shortage of persuasive
arguments in favor of including deforestation as part of climate
protection. Indeed, the larger story of how deforestation is being
incorporated into global climate governance, and how this is in turn
driving significant changes in laws governing forests and land use
throughout the tropics, illustrates the emergence of what could be
described as an attempt at "earth systems governance"' and, more
5. See Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC art. 3(3), Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/197/L.7/Add.1, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (discussing treatment
of forests in accounting for commitments of Annex I Parties); UNFCC Land Use, supra note 3,
at 60 (restricting forestry activities under the Clean Development Mechanism during the first
Kyoto commitment period to afforestation and reforestation). The term REDD was first used in
2005 in a submission at the Montreal UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
Conference of the Parties meeting. At the time, the term referred to "Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation in Developing Countries." See UNFCC, SUBMISSION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF
PAPUA NEW GUINEA & COSTA RICA, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: APPROACHES TO SIMULATE ACTION (2005) [hereinafter
SUBMISSION BY PAPUA NEW GUINEA & COSTA RICA], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2005/cop11/eng/miscO1.pdf. Although this terminology is still employed, in recent years
REDD has also come to stand for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation. See UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.13: Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1* (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter UNFCCC, Bali Action Plan] (calling for
"[plolicy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries"); see also infra Parts III.B and
III.C.
6. See infra Part III.C; see also William Boyd, Deforestation and Emerging Greenhouse
Gas Compliance Regimes: Toward a Global Environmental Law of Forests, Carbon, and Climate
Governance, in DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE: REDUCING CARBON EMISSIONS
FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION (Valentina Bosetti & Ruben Lubowski
eds., 2010) (discussing efforts to integrate REDD into climate policy at multiple levels).
7. See, e.g., Frank Biermann & Philip Pattberg, Global Environmental Governance:
Taking Stock, Moving Forward, 33 ANN. REV. OF ENV'T. & RESOURCES 277, 288 (2008)
(describing earth system governance as an effort to expand global environmental governance to
take account of the "the ongoing transformation of the entire earth system, from global
warming, large scale changes in biogeochemical cycles, to unprecedented rates of species loss");
Eva Lovbrand, Johannes Stripple & Bo Wiman, Earth System Governmentality: Reflections on
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importantly, what Professors Tseming Yang and Robert Percival describe
as "global environmental law."'
As this Article argues, however, a fundamental part of the story
involves the cultivation and deployment of a new way of seeing the
problem of deforestation-that is, a new way of constructing the problem
as part of a larger effort to manage the global carbon cycle embodied in
particular practices of post-World War II earth systems science,
significant advances in satellite-based remote sensing of global land cover
change, and the development of legal and accounting frameworks for
translating forest carbon into compliance carbon. There is, in short, an
important epistemological explanation for how deforestation has become
an object of global climate governance, an explanation that merits
exploration independent of the larger institutional story.
The premise of this Article, then, is that isolating the epistemological
part of the story brings into focus a foundational element of
environmental law and governance that is largely neglected in traditional
legal scholarship. Such an approach provides the basis for some
important theoretical claims about the nature and practice of
environmental law and governance, namely, the fundamental role that
ways of seeing play in the making of environmental law. As used here, the
phrase "ways of seeing" is intended to encompass the various practices,
conventions, techniques, tools, infrastructures, and institutions that allow
certain phenomena to be organized and understood as coherent objects
of governance. A central claim is that environmental law has lost sight of
the constitutive role that the knowledge practices and supporting
infrastructures commonly relegated to the realm of science and
technology play in providing form and substance to the field.
Inquiring directly into how these knowledge practices and
supporting infrastructures create particular objects of governance
promises to deepen current understandings of the intellectual
foundations of environmental law and offer some new directions for a
positive theory of the discipline. To that effect, this Article argues that
the seemingly technical work involved in rendering certain environmental
Science in the Anthropocene, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 7 (2009), (investigating the "range of
practices that have produced the 'coupled human and ecological system' as a thinkable and
governable domain"); Nicholas A. Robinson, Legal Systems, Decisionmaking, and the Science of
Earth's Systems: Procedural Missing Links, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1077 (2001) (discussing
implications of earth systems science for law).
8. The multiple and largely complementary initiatives to bring REDD into climate
policy-from the design of GHG compliance systems to the reform of forest law and governance
in tropical forest countries-exemplify the emergence of "global environmental law," manifest
in the construction of cross-jurisdictional regulatory structures and a growing harmonization of
national and sub-national forest law regimes aimed at translating forest carbon into compliance
carbon. See Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law,
36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009) (discussing concept of "global environmental law").
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problems comprehensible for purposes of environmental law and
governance is in fact instrumental in shaping the very possibilities of such
governance and must be interrogated directly as part of the construction
of particular forms of governance. Drawing on history and philosophy of
science,' science and technology studies,"o the social science literature
regarding the manner in which objects of governance are rendered
technical and made amenable to certain forms of state intervention," and
previous work on the intellectual foundations of environmental law,12 the
Article seeks to recover a critical appreciation for the role of science and
technology in constructing objects of environmental governance-
9. There is a vast literature on history and philosophy of science. This Article draws
primarily on work within these fields that investigates how particular concepts, tools, and other
knowledge practices work to organize and stabilize particular understandings of the world, often
in ways that are co-constitutive with particular forms of governance. See, e.g., IAN HACKING,
HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY 4 (2002) (describing his overall approach to a diverse set of intellectual
developments-from the emergence of probability to the making of child abuse as a stable
category of concern-as one that asks "how ... various concepts, practices, and corresponding
institutions, which we can treat as objects of knowledge, at the same time disclose new
possibilities for human choice and action"); Lorraine Daston, Objectivity and the Escape from
Perspective, 22 SOC. STUD. SCI. 597 (1992) (exploring the emergence of different forms of
objectivity and their application in various domains); THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN
NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995) (tracing the
histories of various techniques of quantification and their role in science and public policy);
Naomi Oreskes, Why Believe a Computer? Models, Measures, and Meaning in the Natural World,
in THE EARTH AROUND US: MAINTAINING A LIVABLE PLANET (Jill S. Schneiderman ed., 2000)
(discussing how modeling practices in the sciences create new objects of knowledge).
10. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Ordering Knowledge, Ordering Society, in STATES OF
KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER 18-19 (Sheila Jasanoff
ed., 2004) (discussing different approaches to knowledge and epistemic authority within the
science and technology studies literature); Steven Yearley, Nature and the Environment in
Science and Technology Studies, in THE HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES
921-23 (Hackett et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008) (discussing increasing attention in science and
technology studies to questions of environment and, more specifically, to ways of "knowing
nature").
11. See, e.g., NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT
205 (1999) ("When ... numbers are used as 'automatic pilots' in decision making they transform
the thing being measured-segregation, hunger, poverty-into its statistical indicator and
displace political disputes into technical disputes about methods."); JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING
LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED
4-5 (1998) (describing modern "statecraft" as resting on projects intended to simplify and make
legible natural and social systems); JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE 256
(1994) (showing, through a detailed case study in Lesotho, how the international "development
apparatus" operates as "the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-
politicized in the world today").
12. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 66, 78 (1972) [hereinafter Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?] (seeking "to
investigate the ways in which a self-consciously objectivist ideal may substantively structure the
characteristics and the conclusions of a given mode of thought"); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL.,
THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 5 (1974) (exploring "the uncertain
intellectual foundations of the substance of environmental policy in the United States" through a
detailed case study of the deployment of "technocratic intelligence" in the effort to solve the
water pollution problem in the Delaware River basin).
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focusing on the distinctive ways of seeing that make problems "objective"
and "legible" for regulation. Too often, the study and practice of
environmental law and governance take the object of governance-be it
climate change, water pollution, biodiversity, or deforestation-as self-
evident, natural, and fully-formed without recognizing the significant
scientific and technological investments that go into making such objects
and the manner in which such investments shape the possibilities for
response.' To be sure, the literature on epistemic communities pioneered
in the study of stratospheric ozone depletion,14 the perennial concern
with technocratic forms of knowledge and decision-making," and the vast
literature exploring the role of scientific uncertainty in particular legal
and regulatory contexts'" have highlighted the role of science and
technical expertise in environmental law and governance. But these
literatures have not been integrated with key insights from science and
technology studies regarding how particular knowledge practices are co-
constitutive with the nature and practice of governance. 7 Indeed, there
seems to be a general perception in environmental law scholarship that
science and technology operate as discrete inputs to, and/or neutral tools
for, environmental law and governance rather than as active forces in the
very construction of those objects of governance through the deployment
of specific knowledge practices and particular techniques of
13. See Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards, Globalization of Climate Science and Climate
Politics, in CHANGING THE ATMOSPHERE: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE 1, 5 (Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards eds., 2001) ("Science . . . thus appears
less an independent input to global governance than an integral part of it: a human institution
deeply engaged in the practice of ordering social and political worlds.").
14. See Peter M. Haas, Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to
Protect Stratospheric Ozone, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY
COORDINATION (Peter M. Haas ed., 1992).
15. The general critique of technocratic forms of decision-making has been a recurring
theme in environmental law scholarship for more than thirty years and, of course, draws upon
much older philosophical and sociological critiques of instrumental reason. See, e.g., ACKERMAN
ET AL., supra note 12, at 2-3 (critiquing the shortcomings of "technocratic intelligence" in the
effort to model and control pollution in the Delaware River basin); Laurence Tribe, Technology
Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L.
REV. 617, 627 (1973) [hereinafter Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity]
(focusing on the reductionist tendencies of the policy sciences and the resulting pathologies).
16. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1613 (1995) (discussing ways in which science gets mobilized in toxics regulation);
Marcia R. Gelpe & A. Dan Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental
Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371 (1974) (exploring the ways in which science informs
environmental decisionmaking).
17. See Jasanoff, supra note 10, at 19-36 (discussing varieties of the co-production of
knowledge and social order). For an earlier effort within legal scholarship that bears some
resemblance to this approach, see Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, supra note 12, at
67 (asking how "particular modes of analysis in a number of different fields-particular
approaches to formulating questions, organizing information, and developing answers-entail
fundamental (if often unwitting) commitments to substantive conclusions shaped in
characteristic and often unfortunate ways").
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objectification that structure environmental decision-making. 8 Such a
perception stems in part from the assumption that scientific
understandings of the world "acquire political authority because they
mirror the realities of nature"19 rather than as a result of extensive
investments in discerning, formatting, and stabilizing such understandings
as particular domains of inquiry. By attending to the actual manner in
which scientific and technical knowledge practices are mobilized in
environmental law and governance, we gain a more complete
understanding of how certain forms of governance become possible, and
why they sometimes fall apart.
In the case of tropical deforestation, this is manifest in efforts since
the 1980s to conceptualize tropical deforestation as a component of the
global carbon cycle, in the ongoing effort to develop and apply new
remote sensing techniques to land-cover change as a basis for mapping
and quantifying emissions from deforestation at a global scale, and in the
effort to translate forest carbon into compliance carbon. Together, these
efforts constitute a process of (re)formatting the forest as an object of
global carbon governance; that is, these new ways of seeing have
rendered a problem previously viewed as one of species loss, North-South
commodity linkages, macro-economic imbalances, and institutional
shortcomings as a critical component of the climate change challenge that
is potentially amenable to treatment in existing and emerging GHG
compliance regimes. 20 Attending to the role of these knowledge practices
and their supporting infrastructures in opening up spaces for global
governance, in part by rendering messy social and political problems as
technical problems amenable to managerial solutions at a global scale, is
a key objective of this Article.
But the implications of such an approach clearly go beyond the
deforestation case, providing a basis for rethinking certain assumptions
about the nature and practice of environmental law. By focusing on how
particular environmental problems get constructed and stabilized as
objects of governance, we gain new perspective on the possibilities for
(and the limits of) regulation. Environmental law, in this view, depends
fundamentally upon particular forms and techniques of objectification,
which have heretofore been largely neglected in explanations of the
discipline.
To that end, Part I establishes the general theoretical and
methodological orientation of the Article, focusing on the role of
18. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 108-110,294 (2002) (discussing role of "science" as key input to risk regulation).
19. Clark Miller, Climate Science and Global Political Order, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE:
THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER 46,50 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004).
20. See infra Parts II-IV.
[Vol. 37:843850
WAYS OF SEEING
objectification and ways of seeing in environmental law, and how this
relates to existing perspectives on the development of the field. Part II
introduces the deforestation case study, tracing the ways in which tropical
forests were constituted historically as a unitary, calculable object of
global concern during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the
manner in which the tropical forest crisis of the last several decades has
been framed and approached outside of the climate policy context. Part
III then discusses briefly the role of tropical deforestation in global
climate change, the treatment of forests under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, and
the ongoing effort to bring emissions from deforestation into emerging
GHG compliance regimes. The intent here is simply to illustrate the fact
that tropical deforestation has very recently become an important object
of climate governance, and to highlight some of the challenges involved
in making it so. Part IV then focuses specifically on the underlying
knowledge practices and supporting infrastructures that have allowed
tropical deforestation to be reformatted as an object of climate
governance, with specific attention to three such knowledge practices:
kind-making, as manifested in carbon cycle research during the post-
World War II period; calculability, as illustrated by advances in remote
sensing and the ability to visualize and map tropical forests on a global
scale; and equivalence, as realized by the deployment of particular legal
and accounting practices for translating forest carbon into compliance
carbon. Finally, Part V advances some larger theoretical claims about
ways of seeing in environmental law.
I. OBJECTIFICATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
As a discipline, environmental law has tended to emphasize its roots
in economics (with a focus on externalities and cost-benefit balancing),
engineering (with a focus on control technologies and margins of safety),
ecology (with an emphasis on interconnectedness and dynamic systems),
and ethics (with an emphasis on rights and distributive justice).21 Very
little attention has been given to the ways in which the knowledge
practices of science and technology shape the problems that
21. See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
2-4 (1997) (describing economic foundations of environmental law); Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats,
Birds, and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 417-31
(1994) (describing transition to technology-based approaches in major pollution control
statutes); Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 863 (1994) (arguing that "ecology
remains the foundation of environmental law because it informed society about adverse
consequences of a wide range of human activity"); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE
EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 14-17 (1988) (discussing ethical
foundations of health, safety, and environmental regulation).
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environmental law targets for regulation. The literatures on framing and
epistemic communities come closest to such a perspective, although those
literatures look more at how people frame and understand problems,
often as a reflection of underlying biases or heuristics, or, in the case of
epistemic communities, how scientific experts and policy elites frame and
legitimate approaches to complex problem areas.' The approach taken
here, in contrast, focuses less on framing, important as it is, than on
objectification and the particular ways that science and technology create
and condition the possibilities for particular framings. Such an approach
has some affinity with the work of legal scholars and social scientists
interested in bringing the insights of science and technology studies into
the study of law, regulation, and governance as well as those interested in
the broader question of "how law knows."'
22. On epistemic communities, see Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 791 (Daniel Bodansky, Jutta
Brun6e & Ellen Hey eds., 2007); Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistetnic Communities and
International Policy Coordination, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY
COORDINATION 1 (Peter M. Haas ed., 1992). There is a large and diverse social science
literature on framing, including significant work in behavioral economics and the policy sciences,
that has had considerable influence on legal scholarship. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251, S270-75 (1986)
(discussing how the framing of particular choices affects decision making in situations of risk); B.
Dan Wood & Alesha Doan, The Politics of Problem Definition: Applying and Testing Threshold
Models, 47 AM. J. POL. ScI. 640, 640 (2003) (reviewing political science literature directed at
understanding "how and why conditions become defined as public problems"). Of more direct
relevance to this project are studies that investigate how "issue framing" and the construction of
global environmental problems influence governance approaches. See, e.g., Josee van
Eijndhoven et al., The Long-Term Development of Global Environmental Risk Management:
Conclusions and Implications for the Future, in 2 LEARNING TO MANAGE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION, AND ACID RAIN 192 (Social Learning Group, eds.) (2001)
(discussing the importance of issue framing in constructing frameworks for effective governance
of global environmental problems); Peter J. Taylor & Frederick H. Buttel, How Do We Know
We Have Global Environmental Problems? Science and the Globalization of Environmental
Discourse, 23 GEOFORUM 405, 406 (1992) (pointing to the ways in which the science of global
environmental change facilitates "certain courses of action . . . over others, not just in the use or
misuse of science, but in its very formulation-the problems chosen, categories used,
relationships investigated, and confirming evidence required") (citations omitted).
23. See, e.g., Shelia Jasanoff, Making Order: Law and Science in Action, in THE
HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 761-86 (Edward J. Hackett et al. eds.,
2008) (reviewing science and technology studies literature on law, with specific attention to law's
epistemic authority and knowledge practices); Annelise Rites, A New Agenda for the Cultural
Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 973, 985-89 (2005) (discussing
relevance of science and technology studies to an understanding of particular legal technologies,
in her case modem conflict-of-laws doctrine); Austin Sarat et al., Complexity, Contingency, and
Change in Law's Knowledge Practices: An Introduction, in How LAW KNOWS 9 (Austin Sarat et
al. eds., 2007) ("From the rules of evidence to the technologies of risk management, from the
practices of racial profiling to the development of trade knowledge, from the generation of
independent knowledge practices to law's dependence on outside expertise, even a brief survey
shows that law knows in many different ways, that its knowledge practices are contingent,
responsive to context, and that they change over time."); Mariana Valverde et al., Legal
WAYS OF SEEING
To that effect, it is notable that we lack a well-developed intellectual
history of environmental law that takes seriously scientific and
technological ways of seeing. Of course, there have been countless law
review articles on the varied and variable ways that science gets used and
abused in legal proceedings of one kind or another 24 and no shortage of
reverential invocations of the importance of science-in substance and
procedure-as a model for law and policy. 25 But there is virtually nothing
on the ways in which the actual knowledge practices of science and
technology shape and inform the nature and practice of environmental
law. 26 Nothing (or almost nothing), in other words, that digs into the ways
in which particular scientific and technological ways of seeing render
certain problems comprehensible for purposes of environmental
governance.
By offering a novel orientation for environmental law scholarship,
one that aims at a more comprehensive appreciation of the ways in which
knowledge practices or ways of seeing organize and shape objects of
governance, this Article seeks to fill some of these gaps. As such, it draws
inspiration from earlier work by legal scholars such as Professors
Laurence Tribe and Bruce Ackerman who interrogated some of the
specific knowledge practices involved in environmental policy making,
including what Ackerman and his co-authors referred to as "technocratic
intelligence."27 The approach taken here also draws on contemporary
environmental law scholarship such as the work of Professors Dan
Tarlock and Jonathan Weiner, who have explored the ways in which
Knowledges of Risk, in LAW AND RISK 86-87 (Law Commission of Canada ed., 2005) (discussing
how different "risk knowledge practices" are shaped and deployed by participants in "particular
legal networks").
24. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 16. See also the collection of essays in RESCUING SCIENCE
FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (Wendy
Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006).
25. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 294 (2002) (characterizing book as "a celebration of the centrality of science and
expertise to the law of risk").
26. Shelia Jasanoffs work is a notable exception. See, e.g., SHELIA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH
BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 17-19 (1990) (proposing an alternative
approach to understanding the interaction between scientific experts and the regulatory process
based on an historical, interdisciplinary case-study method that draws upon insights from science
and technology studies).
27. See, e.g., Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, supra note 12; Tribe, Technology
Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity, supra note 15, at 627 (characterizing the reductionist
tendencies of the policy sciences and the resulting pathologies in terms of how particular
problems are framed and interrogated); ACKERMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 5 (exploring "the
uncertain intellectual foundations of the substance of environmental policy in the United States
today" through an exhaustive case study of "technocratic intelligence" and its application to
pollution control in the Delaware River basin).
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specific ecological ideas have shaped environmental law,' and Professor
Douglas Kysar, who has sought to understand the normative implications
of what he calls "pre-analytic vision" for environmental law and the perils
of the technocratic quest to build an objective, welfarist foundation for
environmental policy choices.29 What unites these different scholars for
purposes of this Article is the fact that all of them, in one way or another,
have sought to understand how specific concepts and framings from the
natural and social sciences have shaped environmental law. All of them
have sought, in other words, to understand how environmental law
frames its subject matter.
In building on the work of these scholars, this Article focuses less on
the paradigms or background assumptions that shape a particular
approach to environmental law than on the concepts, practices, and tools
that discern and stabilize the objects or problems that animate the field.
The orientation is similar in some respects to the work of Professors Jim
Salzman and J.B. Ruhl on the fungibility problem in environmental
trading markets, with their attention to "what is actually being traded" in
such markets and the challenges of developing currencies or proxies as a
means of commodifying certain environmental benefits." At a more
28. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1994) (providing an overview of
how the shift in ecology from the older "balance of nature" concept that characterized systems
ecology in the post-World War II period to the "non-equilibrium paradigm" has reshaped
environmental law); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories,
and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.O. 325, 329 (1995) (discussing the influence of mid-twentieth
century ecological ideas such as the balance of nature on environmental law); see also Harry N.
Scheiber, From Science to Law to Politics: An Historical View of the Ecosystem Idea and its
Effect on Resource Management, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 631, 635 (1997) (exploring how the
"scientific vision, and the methodology of ecological investigation," provided the foundation for
the ecosystem management approach to marine fisheries).
29. See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675, 677
(2003) (focusing on the "fundamental conceptual flaw in our background assumptions about the
natural world and its relation to our economic activity"-what Kysar calls "pre-analytic
vision"-that drives mainstream economic thought and, by extension, modem environmental
decision making in ways that are unsustainable); see also Douglas A. Kysar, REGULATING FROM
NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010) (discussing the
narrow and misguided rationalities of strict welfarist approaches, manifest in tools such as
quantitative risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis, to environmental policy-making); Douglas
A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 586 (2004) [hereinafter Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural
Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality] (discussing how "the very structure of the CBA
[Cost-Benefit Analysis] project" tends "to obscure difficult judgments through
mischaracterization or misspecification").
30. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611 (2000); see also Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO.- Lessons of
Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 91 (2008) (discussing tradeoffs between
precision and alienability in the creation of entitlements for environmental trading markets);
Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What Science Can Do to
Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 273, 283 (2005) (concluding that one of the main reasons why
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abstract level, it reflects a concern with what Christopher Stone, in
another context, referred to as "legal ontology" -a focus on how certain
objects, in his case "natural objects" such as trees, are conceptualized and
made amenable (or not) to certain types of legal regimes." By focusing
on how the object of governance itself-whether water pollution, global
climate change, biodiversity, or deforestation-has come to be organized
and understood as such, the intent is to resist the tendency to naturalize
environmental problems and instead take environmental law scholarship
in a direction that is more sensitive to the historical epistemology of the
field.
The term historical epistemology may seem odd to some readers,
juxtaposing two seemingly disparate fields of inquiry. Of course, the label
itself is far less important than the mode of inquiry it represents. As
understood here, historical epistemology starts from the premise that our
concepts, tools, and styles of reasoning-our knowledge practices-have
histories and those histories matter, not only in understanding the origins
and meanings of particular knowledge practices, but also in
understanding the effects that such knowledge practices have in shaping
our views of the world and concomitant modes of governing."
cap-and-trade has not been deployed more widely is the "unsolved problem" of "measurement"
of quality improvements associated with trading).
31. See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?- Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 n.26 (1972) (discussing the difficult ontological
choices involved in selecting and framing a particular "natural object," which will in turn have "a
strong influence on the shape of the legal system").
32. See Lorraine Daston, Historical Epistemology, in QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE: PROOF,
PRACTICE, AND PERSUASION ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES, 243, 282-83 (James Chandler et al.
eds., 1991) (describing "historical epistemology" as the "history of the categories that structure
our thought, pattern our arguments and proofs, and certify our standards for explanation"); IAN
HACKING, HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY 8 (2002) ("The ideas examined by historical epistemology
are the ones we use to organize the field of knowledge and inquiry. They are, often despite
appearances, historical and 'situated'."); MARY POOVEY, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN FACT:
PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCES OF WEALTH AND SOCIETY 7 (1998) ("Insofar as
historical epistemology assumes that the categories by which knowledge is organized-not only
epistemological units like facts, but also institutionalized units like disciplines and professional
societies-inform what can be known at any given time, as well as how this knowledge can be
used, historical epistemology is a study of determination and effects. Insofar as historical
epistemology assumes that the categories by which knowledge is organized change over time, it
is less a study of the inexorable march of 'science' toward a fully adequate description of nature
than an investigation of those developments that have increasingly made Westerners believe that
this march is underway."). Much of the research carried out under the banner of historical
epistemology draws inspiration from earlier work by Michel Foucault, among others. See, e.g.,
1MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES
xxii (Vintage Books 1994) (1970) ("[W]hat I am attempting to bring to light is the
epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having
reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby
manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of
possibility .... ).
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Such a perspective highlights three important sets of knowledge
practices that are instrumental in constructing many of the objects of
environmental law: (1) kind-making, the role of particular knowledge
practices and their supporting infrastructures in creating the categories or
kinds that define and structure environmental problems (think, for
example, of the enormous effort that has gone into making global climate
change a stable object of inquiry and governance); (2) calculability, the
constellation of practices that give a particular problem the necessary
stability and coherence across space and time in order to sustain it as an
object of governance (manifest, for example, in the radically enhanced
ability to monitor toxic substances in the environment, the modeling and
simulation of global climate change, and remote sensing of land use, to
name a few); and (3) equivalence, the translation of heterogeneous
phenomena into common, fungible units or "currencies" as a basis for
particular regulatory strategies (something that is particularly evident in
the climate policy context where carbon is rapidly becoming the coin of
the realm, but which extends to other environmental trading markets and
beyond).3 ' Focusing on these ways of seeing provides a new point of
departure for understanding the "making of environmental law"34 with
important theoretical, methodological, and normative implications.
Indeed, any mature positive theory of environmental law-that is, a
theory of how and why environmental law does its work-must account
for the way that its subject matter comes to be organized as such. Any
comprehensive explanation of the "making of environmental law," in
other words, must attend to the specific knowledge practices that shape
the field rather than focusing exclusively on legal, institutional, or
political questions. If one accepts this, then the making of environmental
law becomes more than a story about efforts to manage spillovers and
externalities, commons problems of various kinds, or various sorts of
ecological and human harm, more than a story about the particular policy
choices and legal practices involved in governing such problems. It
becomes a story also about how certain ways of seeing these problems
became possible, and how these ways of seeing have shaped and
conditioned the possibilities for response. Such ways of seeing, moreover,
(and this is the methodological point) must be investigated as historically
situated practices-a point that, if taken seriously, opens up an expansive
domain for future research oriented toward the ways in which particular
problems, concepts, and knowledge practices have emerged within the
33. See, e.g., Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 30 (raising important questions about the
feasibility of efforts to create common currencies for diverse and heterogeneous phenomena in
the context of environmental trading markets); see also infra Part IV.C.




field of environmental law. Finally, there are obvious normative
implications embedded within such an approach, a full discussion of
which is beyond the scope of this Article; namely, the ways in which
particular ways of seeing valorize certain claims or interests vis-A-vis
others, the manner in which messy social and political problems are
rendered technical through particular knowledge practices, and the
manner in which certain modes and scales of governance are privileged
relative to others by virtue of how objects of governance are defined.
The following three Parts explore these claims through a study of
how tropical deforestation has been reformatted as a viable object of
climate governance. The intent is to use the case study as a way of
situating and grounding the theoretical claims that will be elaborated
further in Part V. The deforestation story, in other words, allows us to see
how the specific knowledge practices of kind-making, calculability, and
equivalence are worked out in a concrete historical setting-how the
actual process of objectification is happening in a particular case-
offering a rehearsal of sorts for the more general theoretical discussion in
Part V.
II. TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AS A GLOBAL PROBLEM
Forests have long occupied a prominent place in the western
imagination, from the very idea of wilderness to contemporary narratives
of global ecological destruction." Likewise, the regulation of forest access
and use has long been a focus of governing elites, illustrated most
prominently in the modern era by the criminalization of customary forest
uses throughout the world and the development of extensive bureaucratic
systems for managing "state" forests. 6 During the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, efforts to rationalize and professionalize state
forestry led to a distinctive European model of "scientific forestry" built
on a managerial logic of simplification and control-a new way of seeing
forests as objects of calculation and state regulation that was soon
exported throughout the world as part of the colonial enterprise.37
35. See ROBERT POGUE HARRISON, FORESTS: THE SHADOW OF CIVILIZATION (1992)
[hereinafter HARRISON, SHADOW OF CIVILIZATION]; SIMON SCHAMA, LANDSCAPE AND
MEMORY (1995); MICHAEL WILLIAMS, DEFORESTING THE EARTH: FROM PREHISTORY TO
GLOBAL CRISIS (2003) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, DEFORESTING THE EARTH].
36. See, e.g., EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK
ACt (1975); NANCY LEE PELUSO, RICH FORESTS, POOR PEOPLE: RESOURCE CONTROL AND
RESISTANCE IN JAVA 8-17 (1992); HARRISON, SHADOW OF CIVILIZATION, supra note 35, at 69
(documenting the origins of the word forest as "a juridical term referring to land that had been
placed off limits by a royal decree" and discussing the emergence of a specific domain of "forest
laws" for punishing those who encroached upon these domains).
37. See, e.g., Henry E. Lowood, The Calculating Forester: Quantification, Cameral Science,
and the Emergence of Scientific Forestry Management in Germany, in THE QUANTIFYING SPIRIT
IN THE 18TH CENTURY 315, 317 (Tore Fringsmyr, J.L. Heilbron & Robin E. Rider eds., 1990)
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Embedded within this new way of seeing was a tendency to view forests
as a global resource and, accordingly, a capacity to frame tropical
deforestation as a global crisis. As elaborated in Part IV below, these two
perspectives-forests as calculable object and as global resource-
together provide the provenance for contemporary efforts to frame
tropical deforestation as an object of global carbon governance. The
remainder of this Part will elaborate on the global framing of tropical
forests during the last century and the dominant ways of approaching the
tropical forest crisis since the 1980s.
A. Constructing the Global Forest
Although widespread concern regarding tropical deforestation as a
global problem is of relatively recent vintage, a number of forestry
professionals in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did seek
to call attention to the destruction of tropical forests.38 Motivated
primarily by the prospect of global timber shortage, which was in part a
projection of the resource conservation ethos that dominated national
forest departments, these forest professionals launched a series of
piecemeal efforts to assess the state of the world's forest resources and
their capacity to meet growing economic demands." These early
assessments proved instrumental in constructing the concept of a "global
forest":
After 1920, forests everywhere in the world were coming under
scrutiny and being assessed. What happened in one part of the world
had repercussions in another part. Of course, that had always been
true, but now it was clearly recognized that individual forests were
"only segments of a great whole." The "forest" was now being looked
at as not only a global resource but an object of knowledge, a large-
scale conceptual entity that could be visualized, managed, made
productive, and "economized.""
(tracing the history of forest science and quantitative approaches to forest management to the
rise of cameral sciences in Germany during second half of the 18th century); SCOTT, supra note
11, at 11-22 (1998) (discussing the history of scientific forestry as a history of state-directed
simplification and legibility); ARUN AGRAWAL, ENVIRONMENTALITY: TECHNOLOGIES OF
GOVERNMENT AND THE MAKING OF SUBJECTS 32, 58-59 (2005) ("Representation by numbers
transformed beliefs among foresters about ideal forests and made possible the reworking of
existing vegetation in terms of scientific forestry, sustainable yields, and profit maximization....
Numbers and statistics made it possible to constitute forests.").
38. See, e.g., Raphael Zon, Forests and Human Progress, 10 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 139, 163
(1920) ("Over a large part of the world the forest is now conquered.").
39. See WILLIAMS, DEFORESTING THE EARTH, supra note 35, at 393-95 (documenting
early twentieth century concerns of a global timber famine and the concomitant effort to assess
the state of the world's forest resources).
40. Id. at 395.
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Forest inventories, of course, had long been central features of
governmental strategies to rationalize forest management. Developed by
German foresters in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
these techniques spread throughout the world as key elements of a new
"scientific forestry," emphasizing the rational and efficient management
of natural resources." Professional foresters in the United States, many
of whom were trained in the tradition of German forestry, initiated
efforts to inventory and quantify standing timber in federal forest
reserves during the early twentieth century,42 and soon expanded these
efforts to forests throughout the country. Animated by the so-called
gospel of efficiency, these early assessments sought to quantify the timber
available in the face of what some saw as an impending timber shortage,
with the overall goal of providing a basis for rational resource
management.4 3 Far more than a gigantic timber cruise, these efforts
represented a powerful new way of seeing the forest and rendering it
calculable in service to the principles of scientific management."
Such efforts were soon transplanted to the global scale, with the
earliest attempt at a comprehensive assessment of global forest resources
prepared in 1910 by the U.S. Forest Service.45 Daunting challenges
confronted such an assessment, and a coordinated push for a global forest
resource assessment did not emerge until shortly after World War II
when the recently established United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) launched a World Forest Inventory, responding to
the same concerns about timber shortages that animated many national-
41. See Lowood, supra note 37, at 341 (discussing the spread of quantitative approaches to
forest science from Germany to French and English colonies and to the United States during the
nineteenth century); S. RAVI RAJAN, MODERNIZING NATURE: FORESTRY AND IMPERIAL Eco-
DEVELOPMENT 1800-1950, at 55 (2006) ("By the end of the nineteenth century ... [w]here there
had once been state-sponsored forest destruction, there were now extensive state-sponsored
regimes of scientific resource management.").
42. See MICHAEL WILLIAMS, AMERICANS AND THEIR FORESTS: A HISTORICAL
GEOGRAPHY 430-40 (1989) (discussing forest inventory efforts in the United States in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries); HENRY CLEPPER, PROFESSIONAL FORESTRY IN THE
UNITED STATES 266-67 (1971) (discussing the emergence of a Continuous Forest Inventory
(CFI) system in the United States during the 1930s).
43. SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 27-48 (1959) (discussing concerns
about the waste and destruction of the nation's timber resources during the late nineteenth
century and the push for a program of "scientific management").
44. See, e.g., David Demeritt, Scientific Forest Conservation and the Statistical Picturing of
Nature's Limits in the Progressive-Era United States, 19 ENV'T & PLAN. D: SoC'Y & SPACE 431,
433 (2001) (discussing efforts to develop "new techniques of quantitative picturing" of forest
resources in the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and how
this "quantitative picturing provided both the context and the impetus for the governmental
institution of scientific conservation").
45. RAPHAEL ZON, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE BULLETIN NO. 83, THE
FOREST RESOURCES OF THE WORLD (1910).
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level inventories.4 For the next two decades, the organization undertook
a series of regional assessments and by the early 1970s began to turn its
attention to a more systematic assessment of the state of tropical forests
and the impacts of deforestation, reflecting a growing recognition that
tropical forests could no longer be viewed as unlimited resources.47 More
than anything else, however, these early assessments reinforced the basic
conclusion that knowledge of the true state of tropical forests was
extremely limited. 48 Given the scale of the task, combined with the lack
of capacity and basic infrastructure in many tropical forest countries,
some of which were just emerging from colonial rule, it was obvious that
the traditional, field-based approaches to forest inventories would not
suffice. In response, professional foresters and others looked to new
remote sensing techniques as the basis for a fundamentally different
approach to global forest resource assessment. 49 As will be discussed in
more detail in Part IV.B below, starting in the mid-1980s, ecologists and
others concerned with tropical deforestation began using these
techniques to assess the state of tropical forests on regional and,
ultimately, global scales, ushering in a new way of seeing that has proved
instrumental in reframing tropical forests as an object of global climate
governance.
B. Tropical Forests in Crisis
One of the more important consequences of the effort to visualize
tropical forests as a unitary, calculable object of global concern was the
realization that such forests were in crisis. For much of the colonial
period, of course, tropical forests were considered so vast as to be
unlimited for all intents and purposes."o Empire building and economic
expansion both viewed tropical forests as obstacles to progress rather
46. FAO, Forest Resources of the World, 2 UNASYLVA 161 (1948); see also P. Holmgren &
R. Persson, Evolution and Prospects of Global Forest Assessments, 53 UNASYLVA 3, 4 (2002).
47. See, e.g., A. Sommer, Attempt at an Assessment of the World's Tropical Forests, 112-13
UNASYLVA 5, 5 (1976) (documenting the change in thinking regarding tropical forests from "a
euphoric belief in its unlimited growth .. . as an almost infinite resource" to an awareness of the
"limited extension of these forest resources and their gradual regression due to increasing
human activities," which placed a premium on a global-level assessment).
48. Id. at 5 (describing the available material for conducting a global appraisal of tropical
moist forests as "a mass of incomplete data and a number of assumptions"); see also Editorial: A
New Awareness of Terra Incognita, 28 UNASYLVA 2, 2 (1976) (characterizing the tropical moist
forest as "man's least understood ecological formation").
49. See, e.g., Sommer, supra note 47, at 5 ("It is only recently that, thanks to the new
remote sensing techniques we have at last a tool which can give us an objective and accurate
appraisal of the world's forest resources.").
50. See RAJAN, supra note 41, at 55 (noting that up until the middle of the nineteenth
century "[flor most colonial administrative officials, forests were a vast and seemingly limitless
reservoir of resources for imperial expansion and a hindrance to agricultural development").
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than as assets to be protected." By the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, however, some in the West began to question this
particular ethos, with colonial foresters and others calling attention to the
threats facing tropical forests.52 Louis Lavauden, a French colonial
forester working in Africa, summed up the prevailing view in 1937: "[i]t is
only quite recently . .. that the retreat of the equatorial forest has begun
to arouse interest."" In keeping with the scientific management agenda
that had been gaining currency in colonial forest departments since the
late nineteenth century, Lavauden bemoaned the wasteful destruction of
Africa's tropical forests:
The conclusion is obvious that forest of this type [tropical moist
forest] must be treated with care. The action of Man must never be
opposed to that of Nature. The situation calls for a more intelligent
and far-sighted view than the one circumscribed by the interests of an
individual, a village, or a financial company. How often one sees
clearings made in a spirit of hopefulness that, from the agronomic
standpoint, has no justification in fact. The forest has been
destroyed - and destroyed irretrievably -for a meager and ephemeral
profit.54
Echoing these concerns, botanists and other scientists involved in the
exploration of tropical forests (often as part of the colonial enterprise)
called attention to the incalculable losses associated with rapid
deforestation. Writing just after World War II, for example, E.J.H.
Corner saw in the destruction of tropical forests a grave threat to science:
"I fear lest all the virgin lowland forest of the tropics may be destroyed
before botany awakes: even our children may never see the objects of our
delight which we have not cared for in their vanishing."" Paul Richards,
author of one of the first monograph-length ecological studies of tropical
forests, pointed to a range of negative impacts associated with tropical
deforestation, including loss of genetic material, reduced precipitation,
increased soil erosion, loss of commercially valuable timber species, and
the destruction of the "reservoir of natural material represented by the
51. Id.; see also WILLIAMS, DEFORESTING THE EARTH, supra note 35, at 344-79
(documenting European colonial expansion and concomitant destruction of tropical forests after
1750); HARRISON, SHADOW OF CIVILIZATION, supra note 35, at 133-44 (describing nineteenth
century European attitudes toward the vast equatorial forests of central Africa through a
discussion of the novels of Joseph Conrad).
52. See RAJAN, supra note 41, at 3-6.
53. Louis Lavauden, The Equatorial Forest of Africa: Its Past, Present, and Future, 36 J.
ROYAL AFRICAN SOC'Y 3, 6 (1937); see also RAJAN, supra note 41, at 27, 55-107 (discussing
concerns of colonial foresters and others with tropical forest destruction during the nineteenth
century).
54. Lavauden, supra note 53, at 8.




rain forest flora" that surely contained many other species of
"unsuspected value."5 6
Despite such early warnings, widespread recognition that tropical
deforestation was a problem of global scope did not take hold until the
1970s." In large part, such concern reflected the belief that tropical forest
ecosystems were fragile reservoirs of immense species diversity with
limited capacity to regenerate in the wake of extensive clearing for
agriculture." Tropical forests, in other words, began to be seen as
"nonrenewable" resources, a view manifest most prominently in the
realization that destruction of these ecosystems "would mean the loss of
millions and millions of years of evolution, not only of plant and animal
species, but also of the most complex biotic communities in the world.""
By the 1980s, tropical deforestation had climbed to the top of the
world's environmental agenda.' As one prominent ecologist put it:
Rainforests are being steadily depleted in all three major regions of
the tropics. If present rates of misuse and overuse persist (and they
are likely to accelerate), the biome, now covering 9 million square
kilometers, could be reduced to remnant fragments within another
half century. This would represent one of the greatest environmental
impoverishments in the foreseeable future, and one of the greatest
biological debacles to occur on the face of the earth."
An explosion of books on the subject ensued, followed by numerous
campaigns to save the rainforest with seemingly endless appeals on behalf
of any number of threatened amphibians, mammals, and other
charismatic (and not-so-charismatic) fauna.62 In the decades since,
56. P.W. RICHARDS, THE TROPICAL RAIN FOREST: AN ECOLOGICAL STUDY 404-07
(1952) (quoted material at 406).
57. See WILLIAMS, DEFORESTING THE EARTH, supra note 35, at 442-43.
58. See, e.g., A. Gomez-Pompa et al., The Tropical Rain Forest: A Nonrenewable Resource,
177 SCIENCE 762, 765 (1972) (concluding that "under present intensive use of land in tropical
rain forest regions, the ecosystems are in danger of a mass extinction of most of their species");
see also Eneas Salati & Peter B. Vose, Depletion of Tropical Rain Forests, 12 AMBIO 67, 70
(1983) ("The urgency of today's deforestation is that the major remaining primary forests are
tropical, and occupy an extremely fragile environment on mostly poor soils subject to rapid
degradation.").
59. Gomez-Pompa et al., supra note 58, at 765.
60. Several government-sponsored reports from the late 1970s and early 1980s sought to
document the crisis. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., PROCEEDINGS
OF THE U.S. STRATEGY CONFERENCE ON TROPICAL DEFORESTATION (1978); NORMAN
MYERS, NAT'L ACAD. OF SC., CONVERSION OF TROPICAL MOIST FORESTS (1980); WORLD
BANK, WORLD RES. INST. & UN DEV. PROGRAM, TROPICAL FORESTS: A CALL FOR ACTION
(1986). For overviews, see Laura Tangley, Saving Tropical Forests, 36 BIOSCIENCE 4 (1986) and
Brian Johnson, The Forestry Crisis: What Must be Done, 13 AMBIO 48 (1984).
61. Norman Myers, The Hamburger Connection: How Central America's Forests Become
North America's Hamburgers, 10 AMBIO 2 (1981) [hereinafter Myers, The Hamburger
Connection].
62. See, e.g., NORMAN MYERS, THE PRIMARY SOURCE: TROPICAL FORESTS AND OUR
FUTURE (1984); CATHERINE CAUFIELD, IN THE RAINFOREST: REPORT FROM A STRANGE,
862 [Vol. 37:843
WAYS OF SEEING
multiple policy approaches have been advanced to deal with tropical
deforestation, each based on a distinctive way of seeing the problem, and
none of which have translated into workable solutions at scale-as
evidenced by the simple fact that deforestation continues virtually
unabated at some thirteen million hectares per year.63
C. Ways of Seeing, Tropical Deforestation,
and Global Forest Governance
Generalizations about global forest governance do not come easy.
Since the 1980s, with the recognition that tropical forests are in severe
global crisis, conservationists and policymakers have jumped from one
solution to the next, too often holding onto the false hope that each
represented some sort of silver bullet. Early experiments with "debt-for-
nature" swaps, for example, which viewed the problem as one of macro-
economic imbalances and high developing country debt burdens,
generated only a very small amount of debt forgiveness, with minimal
acreage protected, while provoking significant concerns over sovereignty
and indigenous rights in tropical forest countries.' Similarly, the 1985
Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP),6 5 which focused on weak forest
governance and limited institutional capacity in tropical forest countries,
failed to appreciate the complex drivers of deforestation and ended up
creating national planning exercises that severely discounted the rights
and livelihoods of forest-dependent peoples, and actually increased
deforestation in some countries by opening up new areas to logging.66
Biodiversity, a concept advanced by conservation biologists during
the late 1980s and 1990s in order to highlight the massive loss of species
BEAUTIFUL, IMPERILED WORLD (1984); Erik Eckholm, U.N. and Aid Groups Seek to Save
Dwindling Third World Forests, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 29, 1985, at All.
63. See 2005 FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2.
64. The concept was first articulated in 1984 in an editorial by Thomas Lovejoy, then vice
president of the World Wildlife Fund, in which he suggested that "debtor nations willing to
protect natural resources could be made eligible for discounts or credits against their debts."
Thomas E. Lovejoy, Aid Debtor Nations' Ecology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1984, at A31; see also
William K. Reilly, Using International Finance to Further Conservation: The First 15 Years of
Debt-for-Nature Swaps, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS: CHALLENGES AND
PROPOSALS FOR RESOLVING THE THIRD WORLD DEBT CRISIS 197, 197-200 (Chris Jochnick &
Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006) (discussing trends in debt-for-nature and opposition on sovereignty
grounds); Amanda Lewis, The Evolving Process of Swapping Debt for Nature, 10 COLO. J. INT'L
ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 431, 460-66 (1999) (discussing key criticisms of debt-for-nature swaps).
65. See FAO, TROPICAL FORESTRY ACTION PLAN (1985). TFAP was a joint effort of
FAO, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World
Resources Institute (WRI). See Robert Winterbottom, The Tropical Forestry Action Plan: Is it
Working?, 15 NAPA BULLETIN 60, 64 (1994).
66. See ROBERT WINTERBOTTOM, TAKING STOCK: THE TROPICAL FORESTRY ACTION
PLAN AFTER FIVE YEARS 3, 23-24 (1990) (discussing increased deforestation during the five
years, 1985-90, that TFAP was in operation).
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and environmental services associated with tropical deforestation,67 was
memorialized in the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity.' Viewing
tropical deforestation as a fundamental crisis of value, biodiversity
advocates facilitated a significant expansion in protected areas69 as an
effort to triage the accelerating loss of species, and motivated substantial
work on valuation of and payments for ecosystem services." As with
previous efforts, however, the biodiversity approach to tropical
deforestation, although immensely important in advancing conservation,
has been unable to alter the basic incentives driving deforestation and
incapable of supporting governance solutions sufficient to address the
problem at scale." In similar fashion, efforts to frame tropical
67. See WILLIAMS, DEFORESTING THE EARTH, supra note 35, at 411 ("The destruction of
the world's botanical abundance and diversity-the bulk of which probably lies in the tropical
moist forests-has been the most important factor in the rising awareness and concern about
deforestation. Within about 10 years, between 1986 and 1996, biodiversity moved from being an
unknown term to becoming a global byword and the subject of an international convention
signed by over 150 nations. Indeed, it is almost synonymous with deforestation."); DAVID
TAKACS, THE IDEA OF BIODIVERSITY: PHILOSOPHIES OF PARADISE (1996) (tracing history of
the biodiversity concept). According to the best estimates of conservation biologists, more than
half of the Earth's terrestrial species live in tropical forests. See MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM
ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: VOLUME 1: CURRENT STATE AND
TRENDS 601 (Rashid Hassan, Robert Scholes & Neville Ash eds., 2005) ("Tropical Forests cover
less than 10 percent of the Earth's land area but harbor between 50 percent and 90 percent of
Earth's terrestrial species."). Anecdotes of the impossibly luxuriant nature of these forests have
become commonplace. E.O. Wilson, for example, tells the story of a single tree in the Peruvian
Amazon that contains 43 ant species belonging to 26 genera, roughly equal to the entire ant
fauna of the British Isles. See E.O. Wilson, The Current State of Biological Diversity, in
BIODIVERSITY 1, 9 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988).
68. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 1760
U.N.T.S. 143.
69. See Lisa Naughton-Treves et al., The Role of Protected Areas in Conserving
Biodiversity and Sustaining Local Livelihoods, 30 ANN. REV. ENV'T & RESOURCES. 219, 220
(2005) (noting that "[o]ver the past 25 years, the area of land under legal protection has
increased exponentially" and that "[d]uring that same period, biodiversity, a term once solely
considered by scientists, has moved to center stage of global environmental debates"); see also
id. at 232-39 (discussing the role of protected areas in conserving tropical forests); Anthony B.
Rylands & Katrina Brandon, Brazilian Protected Areas, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 612, 615-
16 (2005) (discussing the explosive growth of protected areas in Brazil since the mid-1980s).
70. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD
BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING (2005); James Salzman et al., Protecting
Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POCLY REV. 26 (2000);
Gretchen C. Daily et al., The Value of Nature and the Nature of Value, 289 SCIENCE 395 (2000);
Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387
NATURE 253 (1997).
71. See Daniel C. Nepstad, Governing the World's Forests, in CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY:
REPORT OF THE ASPEN INSTITUTE 37, 40 (B. Babbitt & J. Sarukhdn eds., 2004) ("The number of
plant and animal species contained in a forested landscape declines precipitously only as forest
clearing surpasses 70 or 80 percent. By focusing on species conservation in the world's remaining
blocks of forest, we run the risk of developing conservation strategies that are simply not
ambitious enough."); MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 67, at 34 (concluding
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deforestation as a crisis of international trade and unsustainable
consumption practices in the North, whether from illegal logging or from
trade in agricultural commodities directed at feeding western diets (what
one commentator referred to as the "hamburger connection"7 2), have
thus far had no discernible impact on the problem -either through public
intergovernmental efforts such as the International Tropical Timber
Organization (ITTO)" or through private forest certification schemes
such as the independent Forest Stewardship Council.74 Finally, the push
since the early 1990s to fashion a comprehensive international legal
instrument on forests has been a spectacular failure, foundering on the
fundamental conflict between the conception of tropical forests as the
"common heritage of mankind" and forests as sovereign national
resources, as well as the perennial inadequacy of donor country
financing." Thus, the most recent manifestation of this effort, the UN
Forum on Forests,76 succeeded, after fifteen years of work to secure a
new legal instrument, in adopting the "Non-Legally Binding Instrument
on Sustainable Management of All Types of Forests." The name says it
all.
In sum, the various efforts of the past several decades to construct a
workable global forest governance regime have been marked by repeated
failures and false starts, with few notable success stories. Despite
widespread recognition that tropical forests have been in "crisis" since
that "[t]he mere act of quantifying the value of ecosystem services cannot by itself change the
incentives affecting their use or misuse").
72. Myers, The Hamburger Connection, supra note 61.
73. The ITTO was established in the 1980s as an intergovernmental forum of producing
and consuming countries to promote sustainable management of tropical forests. See Int'l
Tropical Timber Org. [ITTO], About ITTO, http://www.itto.intlenlaboutitto/ (last visited July
7, 2009); DAVID HUMPHREYS, FOREST POLITICS: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION 55-57 (1996) (discussing shortcomings of the ITTO regime).
74. See Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The
Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 47, 48 (2006) (Italy) (characterizing forest certification as
"an extensive global system of forestry regulation"); Benjamin Cashore et al., Introduction:
Forest Certification in Analytical and Historical Perspective, in CONFRONTING SUSTAINABILITY:
FOREST CERTIFICATION IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONING COUNTRIES 7, 8 (Benjamin
Cashore et al. eds., 2006) (observing that "forest certification has had limited uptake in most
developing countries").
75. See Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest
Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 7 (2005) (discussing history of efforts to develop
international legal instrument on forests).
76. Id. at 11 (describing the UN Forum on Forests as "collectively and purposefully
designed to be an empty eggshell: it has no mandate for decision-making, leaves everything for
countries to do, lets them choose what they want to do, does not provide them with financial
assistance to do it, and has no right to hold them accountable for the results of their inaction").
77. See Katharina Kunzmann, The Non-Legally Binding Instrument on Sustainable
Management of All Types of Forests-Towards a Legal Regime for Sustainable Forest
Management?, 9 GERMAN L.J. 981 (2008) (discussing the 2007 principles, which passed the UN
General Assembly in December 2007).
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the early 1980s," the international community has lurched from one
policy approach to another, throwing too little money and too many plans
at the problem and hoping for the best, without any overall effort to forge
a coherent, performance-based approach that addresses directly the
structural tensions embedded in forest governance and the basic forces
driving forest destruction. Explanations of the failure of global forest
governance have focused on a variety of factors, including the
tremendous variability in the forces driving deforestation, deep-seated
conflicts over sovereignty and control of forest resources, and limited
institutional and forest governance capacities at national and sub-national
levels.79 In short, efforts to frame tropical deforestation as a global
problem have not translated into workable solutions in part because
deforestation is not a unitary phenomenon amenable to easy
generalization, much less global governance. Previous ways of seeing the
problem, in other words, have not provided a sufficient foundation for
effective governance, raising the important question of whether a climate
policy approach to deforestation (a very different way of seeing the
problem) will succeed where past efforts have failed.
III. TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AS A CLIMATE PROBLEM
A. The Nature of the Problem
Viewed from a global perspective, the scale of tropical deforestation
is immense. The FAO's most recent Global Forest Resources Assessment
reports that between 2000 and 2005, gross deforestation occurred at an
annual Tate of 12.9 million hectares per year, driven mainly by conversion
of forests to agricultural land.' Since 1980, global forest cover has
78. See, e.g., WORLD COMMISSION ON FORESTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, OUR
FOREST OUR FUTURE: REPORT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON FORESTS AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 2 (1999) (concluding that the world's forests are in severe crisis, threatening the
long-term stability of the biosphere).
79. See Nepstad, supra note 71, at 45 (summarizing the reasons for failure); Deborah S.
Davenport, An Alternative Explanation for the Failure of the UNCED Forest Negotiations, 5
GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 105, 106 (2005) (attributing the failure to establish a global forest
convention at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) to a lack
of U.S. leadership); Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Why is There No International Forestry Law?: An
Examination of International Forestry Regulation, Both Public and Private, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 153, 153 (2001) (arguing that the "political economy and history of national forestry
programs," which focused on conserving and managing forests for timber extraction rather than
for the maintenance of environmental services, has obstructed progress toward a global forest
convention in ways that are more apparent than in the case of other "global commons" issues);
HUMPHREYS, supra note 73, at 171 (attributing lack of global forest convention to developing
country concerns about sovereignty).
80. See 2005 FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 13, 19.
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declined by some 225 million hectares." In the Amazon alone, roughly 17
percent of the forest-60 million hectares, an area equivalent to the size
of France-has been converted to other land uses over the last thirty
years.82 Under business-as-usual scenarios, deforestation rates are
expected to continue in all regions, with particularly high rates in Africa
and South America, for a total of just under 600 million hectares in
cumulative losses by 2050.83 One recent study of the Amazon, for
example, predicted that by 2050, under business-as-usual trends,
projected deforestation will have eliminated 40 percent of the existing
forest."
And there is a massive amount of carbon at stake. Although forests
cover some 30 percent of the land surface of the earth (around 4 billion
hectares), they are the most significant reservoir of terrestrial carbon,
containing an estimated 77 percent of all carbon stored in vegetation and
39 percent in soils.' Collectively, the earth's forests store almost twice
the amount of carbon that is currently in the atmosphere.86 Tropical
forests alone embody a massive reservoir of terrestrial carbon (between
212 and 340 billion metric tons in above ground biomass) that, if
transferred to the atmosphere, would be catastrophic for the climate."
Recent studies have also indicated that tropical forests continue to
81. See JOHAN ELIASCH, CLIMATE CHANGE: FINANCING GLOBAL FORESTS: THE
ELIASCH REVIEW 23 (2008).
82. See C. Azevedo-Ramos, Sustainable Development and Challenging Deforestation in the
Brazilian Amazon: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 59 UNASYLVA 12, 13 (2008).
83. See Jayant Sathaye et al., GHG Mitigation Potential, Costs and Benefits in Global
Forests: A Dynamic Partial Equilibrium Approach 28 fig.4 (Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab.,
Working Paper No. 58291, 2005); Manuel Estrada Porria et al., Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Revisiting the Assumptions 6 (Tyndall
Ctr. for Climate Research, Working Paper 115, 2007).
84. See B.S. Soares-Filo et al., Modeling Conservation in the Amazon Basin, 440 NATURE
520, 520 (2006) (predicting that by 2050, under business as usual, projected deforestation trends
will eliminate 40 percent of the current 540 million ha (5.3 million km2) of Amazon forests,
releasing approximately 117 ± 30 Gt CO2 (32 + 8 petagrams of carbon (PgC)) to the
atmosphere).
85. See 2005 FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at xii; IPCC WG III REPORT,
supra note 4, at 541.
86. See PRENTICE ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS: WORKING
GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 188, 192 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter 2001 IPCC
REPORT] (reporting that the atmosphere contains approximately 730 PgC and that forests and
their soils contain an estimated 1146-1240 PgC, or about 1.7 times more carbon than the
atmosphere).
87. Global carbon stock estimate for tropical forests is from 2001 IPCC REPORT, supra
note 86, at 192 tbl.3.2 (reporting estimates of global carbon stocks for tropical forests, including
carbon in plants and soil, of 428 to 553 PgC, equivalent to 428 to 553 gigatonnes of carbon (GtC)
or 428 to 553 billion metric tons of carbon, and carbon stored in plants in tropical forests of 212
to 340 GtC). For purposes of comparison, total global anthropogenic GHG emissions for 2004
are estimated at 49.0 Gt CO,-eq (about 13 GtC). See IPCC WG III REPORT, supra note 4, at 97
n.1.
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sequester significant amounts of additional carbon, close to 20 percent of
annual global GHG emissions by some estimates.' Losing such forests
would thus prove doubly problematic for the climate, as it would release
large amounts of carbon and destroy a potentially very important
"natural technology" for carbon capture and sequestration. Under the
business-as-usual deforestation projections for the Amazon, some 117
billion tons of CO 2 would be released by 2050 with significant additional
losses in sequestration capacity." Viewed from an economic perspective,
one recent estimate puts the costs of additional climatic disruption
associated with business-as-usual emissions from deforestation at $1
trillion by the end of this century.' And that number does not even begin
to account for the loss of the many social and environmental co-benefits
provided by forests."
As these figures make clear, climate change is not simply a problem
of fossil hydrocarbon combustion, but one that also depends
fundamentally on the management of terrestrial carbon. Not only do
agriculture and forestry account for a significant share of global
anthropogenic GHG emissions (about 30 percent according to the most
recent IPCC report),92 they also provide potentially significant
opportunities for carbon sequestration. Viewed in the aggregate,
emissions from deforestation alone, nearly all of which come from
tropical deforestation, account for a greater share of global emissions
than the entire transportation sector-roughly equivalent to 2005
estimates of annual CO 2 emissions from the United States or China.93
Annual emissions from deforestation also swamp the total reductions
expected under the Kyoto Protocol.94 At the same time, because
88. See Simon L. Lewis et al., Increasing Carbon Storage in Intact African Tropical Forests,
457 NATURE 1003, 1004-05 (2009) (reporting increases in tropical forest carbon stocks in central
Africa and extrapolating from this to conclude that tropical forests worldwide have been
sequestering some 1.3 billion tons of carbon per year, which is almost 20 percent of global
carbon emissions). But see Oliver L. Phillips et al., Drought Sensitivity of the Amazon Rainforest,
323 SCIENCE 1344, 1344 (2009) (concluding that the intense drought conditions in the Amazon
during 2005 resulted in a significant increase in carbon emissions from the forest).
89. See Soares-Filo et al., supra note 84, at 520.
90. See ELIASCH, supra note 81, at 28-32.
91. See id. at 20,49,53.
92. See IPCC WG III REPORT, supra note 4, at 105 fig.1.3b (showing agricultural emissions
at 13.5 percent, forestry emissions at 17.4 percent, energy supply emissions at 25.9 percent, and
transportation emissions at 13.1 percent of global GHG emissions in 2004).
93. See id. As noted above, estimates of emissions from deforestation during the 1990s
were approximately 1.6 GtC/yr, or about 5.8 GtCOJyr. See IPCC WG III REPORT, supra note 4,
at 105 fig.1.3b, 543. CO, emissions in the United States for 2005 were 5.8 Gt/year; Chinese
emissions for the same year were 5.1 GtCOJyr. See INT'L ENERGY ASS'N, WORLD ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2007: CHINA AND INDIA INSIGHTS 199 (2007).
94. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 76 (2006)
(estimating energy-related carbon dioxide emissions from participating Kyoto countries at 422
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emissions from deforestation account for the largest share of emissions in
many developing countries (Indonesia and Brazil, for example, rank
among the top five global emitters when emissions from deforestation are
counted9 5), it is also clear that any international climate regime that is
going to include meaningful emissions reductions by developing countries
must attend to deforestation.
Simply put, in order to even have a chance to achieve the basic
objective of the international climate regime-"stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system" 9 6- reducing deforestation must be part of the effort.
B. Forests in the Current International Climate Regime
And yet, despite the significant contribution that deforestation
makes to climate change, forests have long vexed international climate
policy. Although the regime established by the UNFCCC and elaborated
by Kyoto provides a clear foundation for including forests, based largely
on a conception of forests as important sinks or reservoirs of carbon, the
basic architecture of the regime (as well as climate policy in general)
privileges the role of stationary sources, the energy sector, and fossil
hydrocarbons, creating a fundamental unease with the technical
challenges of incorporating forests and land-use change into an emissions
reduction effort.97 Consequently, the question of how forests would be
accounted for in such a regime proved quite contentious during and after
the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, leading to an uneven set of rules
regarding treatment of forests and land use.98 What emerged from the
million metric tons below the reference case in 2010 and 675 million metric tons below the
reference case in 2030).
95. See WRI, NAVIGATING THE NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 111 tbl.2 (2005).
96. UNFCCC art. 2, June 12, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, U.N. Doc. AJAC.237/18.
97. The UNFCCC provides that policies and measures to address climate change should be
"comprehensive" and "cover all relevant sources, sinks, and reservoirs of greenhouse gases." Id.
art. 3(3). The Convention further directs the Parties to "[p]romote sustainable development, and
promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement . . . of sinks and reservoirs of all
greenhouse gases ... including biomass, forests, ... as well as other terrestrial ... ecosystems."
Id. art. 4(d)(1). Building on this, the Kyoto Protocol contains several provisions intended to
accommodate forests and land use-also known as Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry,
or LULUCF. Article 3(3), for example, provides that "removals by sinks resulting from human-
induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation, and
deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment
period, shall be used to meet the commitments" for the Annex I Parties. Kyoto Protocol, supra
note 5, art. 3(3). In addition, two of the three "flexibility mechanisms" created by the Kyoto
Protocol (Joint Implementation under Article 6 and the Clean Development Mechanism under
Article 12) allow for crediting of certain forest-related activities. Id. arts. 6, 12.
98. UNFCCC Land Use, supra note 3.
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2001 Marrakesh Accords, in short, was a fairly liberal approach to
accounting for forest carbon activities in the Annex I industrialized
countries, and a highly restricted approach to forest projects in
developing countries." Under the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), all projects aimed at avoiding deforestation in developing
countries were excluded from the first Kyoto commitment period
(2008-12), creating an immense gap in international climate policy."
Much of the opposition to including tropical deforestation in the
Kyoto regime was driven by the distinctive politics of the forests issue in
the context of larger climate policy debates, with specific concerns that
liberal rules for forest sector activities under the CDM would provide a
loophole for Annex I countries to avoid making "real" reductions in their
energy sectors, and significant apprehension among some tropical forest
countries such as Brazil about ceding control over national resources."o'
But there were also a number of important technical concerns that posed
significant obstacles to inclusion of avoided deforestation in a project-
based mechanism such as the CDM. Specifically, concerns regarding
leakage,102 Ilon-permanence," additionality," and measurement and
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also Eric C. Bettelheim & Gillonne d'Origny, Carbon Sinks and Emissions
Trading under the Kyoto Protocol: A Legal Analysis, in CAPTURING CARBON AND CONSERVING
BIODIVERSITY: THE MARKET APPROACH 283, 285 (Ian R. Swingland ed., 2004) (emphasizing
inconsistency between rules restricting forest activities in developing countries and those that
allow Annex I countries to account for all forest activities in their own national accounting).
101. See Cathleen Fogel, The Local, the Global, and the Kyoto Protocol, in EARTHLY
POLITICS: LOCAL AND GLOBAL IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 103, 105 (Sheila Jasanoff &
Marybeth Long Martello eds., 2004) (discussing NGO criticisms of Kyoto forest provisions as
"loopholes" that would undermine the environmental integrity of the targets).
102. Leakage refers to the concern that the emissions reductions associated with a particular
project or activity will simply displace the emissions-generating activity to an area outside the
project boundary and, thus, any emissions reduced by the project will "leak" out by virtue of the
new activity. See Ian Noble et al., Implications of Different Definitions and Generic Issues, in
LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY: A SPECIAL REPORT OF THE IPCC 83-85
(Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 2000) (discussing leakage in the context of land use, land use
change and forestry activities); Sandra Brown et al., Project-Based Activities, in LAND USE,
LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY: A SPECIAL REPORT OF THE IPCC 308-14 (Robert T.
Watson et al. eds., 2000) (discussing challenges of assessing and managing leakage associated
with forest carbon project activities).
103. Non-permanence or reversibility refers to the concern that the carbon stored and
credited as part of a particular activity will be released in the future. See Noble et al., supra note
102, at 85-89 (discussing issues of reversibility associated with land use, land use change, and
forestry activities); Brown et al., supra note 102, at 315-16 (discussing reversal risks associated
with forest carbon project activities).
104. Additionality typically refers to the requirement that any emissions reductions or
removals achieved by the project or activity are "additional" to those that would have occurred
under business-as-usual. Assessing additionality thus requires careful establishment of reliable
baselines in order to evaluate project performance against the business-as-usual scenario. See
IPCC WG III REPORT, supra note 4, at 809 (defining additionality); Brown et al., supra note 102,
at 304-08 (discussing issues associated with establishing baselines and assessing additionality for
forest carbon project activities).
WAYS OF SEEING
monitoring were viewed as particularly challenging in the context of
avoided deforestation projects. Of these, leakage was considered to be
one of the more difficult problems to solve, given the challenges of
ensuring that projects aimed at reducing emissions from deforestation
would not simply displace emissions from within the project area to areas
outside the project boundaries, thereby destroying the environmental
integrity of the effort."os Non-permanence or reversibility was also
considered problematic, as there appeared to be no easy way to
guarantee that particular areas of protected forest would not be
deforested in future years, or future commitment periods, given the
distinctive biological vulnerabilities of forests combined with the lack of
basic forest governance and enforcement capabilities in many tropical
forest countries.'" And efforts to establish reliable baselines in order to
assess additionality of avoided deforestation projects proved especially
challenging. Taken together, these technical challenges underscored
the difficulties associated with efforts to make deforestation an object of
climate governance and insert it into a regime oriented primarily toward
emissions from fossil hydrocarbons. As a result, for several years after the
Marrakesh Accords, tropical deforestation was seen as too difficult to
deal with through the climate regime-a problem more appropriately
handled through other instruments. "
105. See Noble et al., supra note 102, at 83-85 (discussing carbon leakage issues associated
with forestry projects); Sandra Brown et al., Issues and Challenges for Forest-Based Carbon-
Offset Projects: A Case Study of the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project in Bolivia, 5
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 99, 106-10 (2000) (discussing
challenges of mitigating leakage associated with one of the first avoided deforestation projects).
106. See Noble et al., supra note 102, at 85-86 (discussing permanence challenges associated
with avoided deforestation activities); Johannes Ebeling & MaY Yasu6, Generating Carbon
Finance through Avoided Deforestation and Its Potential to Create Climatic, Conservation and
Human Development Benefits, 363 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y B 1917, 1919 (2008)
("Permanence of emission reductions was a major controversial issue during earlier climate
negotiations regarding the inclusion of forests as carbon sinks in the Kyoto Protocol. The
concern was that if a newly created sink is burnt or logged, the sequestered carbon will be
released back into the atmosphere and there will be no net emission reduction.").
107. See P.M. Fearnside, Saving Tropical Forests as a Global Warming Countermeasure: An
Issue that Divides the Environmental Movement, 39 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 167, 178-79 (2001)
("One of the criticisms frequently raised against including avoided deforestation in the CDM is
that it would be impossible to establish reliable baselines. The baseline is the scenario without
the mitigation project, which is compared with the observed stocks of carbon after the project to
calculate the carbon gain.").
108. See, e.g., Robert Bonnie et al., Counting the Costs of Deforestation, 288 SCIENCE 1763,
1764 (2000) ("Some countries and even environmental organizations believe that these
[accounting] complexities cannot be overcome and that forest conservation, therefore, should
not be an eligible activity under the CDM."); Bernhard Schlamadinger et al., Should We Include
Avoidance of Deforestation in the International Response to Climate Change?, in TROPICAL
DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 53, 54 (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman




C. An Emerging Consensus? Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)
Since the mid-2000s, however, the frustrations that attended the
Kyoto approach to deforestation have given way to a clear shift in favor
of including deforestation, along with other forest related activities,'" in
any future international climate regime. The signal event in this respect
came in 2005 at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting
in Montreal, when a group of nine nations led by Papua New Guinea and
Costa Rica, and working collectively as the Coalition for Rainforest
Nations (CfRN)," 0 put forward a formal proposal introducing the
concept of "Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing
Countries." In addition to providing the first use of the term REDD,"
this proposal emphasized both the global significance of emissions from
tropical deforestation and the serious gap left open by the lack of any
recognition of this problem in the Kyoto Protocol.112 The proposal was
simple and direct, calling upon the Parties to the UNFCCC "to take note
of present rates of deforestation within developing nations, acknowledge
the resulting carbon emissions, and consequently open dialogue to
develop scientific, technical, policy, and capacity responses to address
such emissions from tropical deforestation.""13 Most importantly, the
proposal stated that Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, along with other
supporting countries, were "prepared to stand accountable for [their]
contributions to global climate stability, provided [that] international
frameworks are appropriately modified, namely through fair and
equitable access to carbon emissions markets."" 4
109. Recent discussions within the UNFCCC process have focused on a series of forest-
related activities, grouped together as "REDD+," which include REDD activities as well as
conservation, sustainable management, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. See, e.g.,
UNFCCC, Draft Decision -/CP.15: Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable
Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries
(2009) [hereinafter UNFCCC, Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to REDD].
110. The original group of countries that supported the proposal by Papua New Guinea and
Costa Rica included: Bolivia, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. See Coalition for Rainforest Nations [CfRN],
http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/eng/ (last visited June 23, 2009).
111. In subsequent discussions, REDD has come to mean Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation. See UNFCCC, Bali Action Plan, supra note 5 (calling for
"[p]olicy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries).
112. UNFCCC, Submission by the Governments of Papua New Guinea & Costa Rica:
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Simulate Action,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1 (Nov. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Submission by Papua New
Guinea & Costa Rica], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/misc01.pdf.




In response, and to the surprise of some observers who recalled the
tortured history of forests in the Kyoto negotiations, the COP initiated a
two-year process under the auspices of the Subsidiary Body for Science
and Technical Advice (SBSTA)-a somewhat obscure organ of the
international climate regime that exemplifies the growing importance of
expert, quasi-scientific bodies in global environmental governance"' -to
review relevant scientific and technical issues and to consider "policy
approaches and positive incentives" for reducing emissions from
deforestation in developing countries.'16 Through this process, as well as
through broader policy debates on the post-2012 climate regime, REDD
has come to occupy an important place on the international climate
policy agenda.
Thus, the so-called Bali Roadmap that was agreed to at the
December 2007 COP-13 meeting in Bali, Indonesia expressly directs that
REDD be included in the negotiations of a post-2012 climate treaty.'17
Since the Bali Action Plan, REDD has continued to gain traction in the
broader international climate policy community, with general support for
including REDD, or what is now referred to as "REDD+,""s in some
form in a post-2012 instrument. Accordingly, at their December 2008
meeting in Poland, the UNFCCC parties put the technical discussions
regarding REDD on an accelerated track and established a process to
negotiate REDD as part of a new climate treaty.'19 More recently, at the
115. See Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 623, 623 (2000) (discussing key role of subsidiary bodies in elaborating
international environmental law); Clark Miller, Hybrid Management: Boundary Organizations,
Science Policy, and Environmental Governance in the Climate Regime, 26 ScI., TECH. & HUM.
VALUES 478, 479-80 (2001) (analyzing the SBSTA as a "boundary organization" that works to
"interpret and manage the production of scientific knowledge and its incorporation into policy
making").
116. See UNFCCC, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries:
Approaches to Stimulate Action: Draft Conclusions Proposed by the President, 2, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2005/L.2 (2005).
117. See UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.13: Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1*
(2007). The Bali meeting also took a separate, more detailed REDD decision, encouraging
further work on policy approaches and methodological issues as well as the initiation of pilot
projects in key countries. See UNFCCC, Decision 2/CP.13: Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/
2007/6/Add.1* (2007).
118. See UNFCCC, Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to REDD, supra note
109.
119. This is reflected most prominently in the draft negotiating text for a new climate treaty
put forward by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the
Convention, which contains extensive provisions dealing with REDD+. See, e.g., UNFCCC, Ad
Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Negotiating
Text, 91 106-28, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/8 (May 19, 2009). Of course, the results (or
lack thereof) of the COP-15 meeting in Copenhagen raise larger questions about the prospects
for post-2012 international climate policy.
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December 2009 COP-15 meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, REDD
received considerable attention and support, despite the limited overall
progress of the meeting. The Copenhagen Accord expressly recognized
the "crucial role of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation" and called for the "immediate establishment of a
mechanism" to mobilize financial resources from developed countries for
capacity building and other REDD related activities.120 Several leading
industrialized countries, including the United States, pledged substantial
financial assistance (some $3.5 billion) for REDD+ activities over the
next three years.' 2 ' And the COP also adopted an important decision on
methodological guidance for REDD.'22 Although it is impossible to
predict at this point the precise shape of post-2012 international climate
policy, REDD appears very well positioned to play a prominent role.
In its own discussions regarding post-2012 climate policy and
revisions to its emissions trading scheme, the European Union has also
emphasized the importance of international forest protection,' and
several European governments-the United Kingdom, Germany, and
France-have staked out significant positions in support of including
deforestation in climate policy.124 Likewise, in the United States, leading
120. See UNFCCC, Draft Decision -/CP.15: Proposal by the President: Copenhagen Accord,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009) (taking note of the Copenhagen Accord),
available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/copl5_cph-auv.pdf.
121. See Beth Daley, 3.5b Pledge Buoys Climate Talks; Poorer Nations Hail Tentative Deal
to Protect Forests, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/
green/articles/2009/12/17/35b pledge-buoys-climatetalks/?page=2.
122. UNFCCC, Draft Decision -/CP.15: Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation,
Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing
Countries (2009).
123. See European Commission, Addressing the Challenges of Deforestation and Forest
Degradation to Tackle Climate Change and Biodiversity Loss, at 10, COM (2008) 645/3
(proposing to dedicate up to five percent of the auction revenues from the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme as a source of financing for a Global Forest Carbon Mechanism); Position of the
European Parliament Adopted at First Reading on 17 December 2008 with a View to the Adoption
of Directive 20091.. /EC of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive
2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading
System of the Community, S 36, EP-PETC1-COD(2008)0013 (Dec. 17, 2008) (committing the
European Union to work toward establishing an internationally recognized system for reducing
deforestation within the context of a post-2012 climate agreement).
124. See, e.g., U.K. DEP'T OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, THE ROAD TO
COPENHAGEN: THE UK GOVERNMENT'S CASE FOR AN AMBITIOUS INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE 53-55 (2009) (emphasizing importance of including forests
in international climate agreement with goal of halting global forest cover loss by 2030); Sigmar
Gabriel, Fed. Env't Minister, F.R.G., Statement at the International Climate Change
Conference in Poznan: Germany's Contribution to Supporting Developing Countries to Reduce
Emissions from Deforestation (REDD) (Dec. 11, 2008) (expressing German government's
support for REDD), available at http://www.bmu.de/english/speeches/doc/42790.php; Press
Release, Common Position of France and Brazil on Climate Change (Nov. 14, 2009)
(committing to "ensure the inclusion of REDD in the Copenhagen agreed outcome"), available
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cap-and-trade bills proposed during the 110th and 111th Congresses have
included provisions that would devote a percentage of U.S. emissions
allowances to capacity building and supplemental reductions from forest
protection activities in developing countries while also recognizing and
crediting reduced emissions from deforestation under international
offsets provisions." At the same time, important environmental and
business groups have voiced strong support for including such provisions
in U.S. legislation,'26 and California and other states are actively working
to find ways to bring credits for international forest protection efforts into
sub-national GHG compliance regimes in the United States.'
The growing attention to REDD as part of climate policy is also
driving changes in the laws governing forests, land use, and carbon rights
in tropical forest countries, putting increasing pressure on previous
conceptions of forests as sovereign resources.12 Indonesia, for example,
recently adopted the world's first national-level REDD regulations,
which identify eligible lands for REDD activities, establish requirements
at https://pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/editoriallactual/ael2/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20091117.gb.html#
Chapitre3.
125. See, e.g., Climate Security Act, S. 3036, 110th Cong. tit. III, pt. H (2008); American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454 [hereinafter Waxman-Markey Bill], 111th
Cong. § 743(e) & tit. III, pt. E (2009); Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733,
111th Cong. §§ 744(e), 753 (2009); American Power Act, S. _ , 111th Cong. § 756(c) (as
circulated in draft form May 12,2010).
126. See, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP [USCAP], A BLUEPRINT FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION: CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. CLIMATE PROTECTION
LEGISLATION 5, 10-11 (2009).
127. See CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN 38, 115 (Oct.
2008) (approved Dec. 2008) (identifying the possibility of accepting offsets in a
California GHG compliance system from "those jurisdictions that demonstrate
performance ... in reducing emissions or enhancing sequestration through eligible forest carbon
activities in accordance with appropriate national or sub-national accounting frameworks"). In
November 2008, the Governors of California, Illinois, and Wisconsin signed a series of
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with four Brazilian states and two Indonesian provinces
calling for cooperation in the development of "rules to ensure that forest-sector emissions
reductions and sequestrations, from activities undertaken at the sub-national level, will be real,
measurable, verifiable and permanent, and capable of being recognized in compliance
mechanisms." See Memorandum of Understanding Related to Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Deforestation art. 2(b) (Nov. 18, 2008). The MOU states and provinces, known
formally as the Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force, have expanded their membership to
include several additional states and provinces from Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria and
are actively involved in developing recommendations for the relevant regulatory authorities
responsible for developing rules that would allow REDD credits into GHG compliance systems.
See GOVERNORS' CLIMATE & FORESTS TASK FORCE, JOINT ACTION PLAN 2 (2009-10),
available at http://www.gcftaskforce.org/documents/GCTF-1000-2009-031.pdf.
128. See IUCN, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REDD, IUCN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
LAW PAPER NO. 77 (John Costenbader ed., 2009) (providing overview of REDD legal and
policy developments in several tropical forest countries, including Brazil, Cameroon, Guyana,
and Papua New Guinea); DAVID TAKACS, FOREST CARBON: LAW AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
(2009) (providing overview of legal and policy issues regarding forest carbon in Brazil, Costa
Rica, Indonesia, and Madagascar).
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and procedures for REDD projects, create a licensing scheme to verify
the effectiveness of carbon storage and distribute carbon credits, and
expressly contemplate linkage with an international REDD
mechanism.'2 9 Brazil, which vigorously opposed the inclusion of avoided
deforestation under the Kyoto Protocol on sovereignty grounds,
amended its national forest law in 2006 to clarify ownership of carbon
rights on public concessions, 3 o and created a new institution in 2008, the
Amazon Fund, to channel revenues from the donor community to forest
protection activities based on national accounting for REDD.13' In 2009,
Brazil also passed legislation intended to simplify the land titling process
and allow certain current occupants to gain legal title. 3 2 And several
Brazilian states are developing sub-national legal and policy frameworks
for REDD.' Finally, some thirty-seven tropical forest countries are
seeking to participate in the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility (FCPF)-a $300 million program for building REDD capacity
and funding pilot activities in these countries.'-
Several factors account for this newfound enthusiasm to include
deforestation as part of climate policy. First, and most important, there is
an increased sense of urgency regarding the problem, marked by the
growing realization that stabilizing the composition of the atmosphere at
anything remotely close to what scientists consider a prudent level
requires addressing emissions from deforestation."' Second, proposed
new accounting frameworks to measure emissions from deforestation and
account for emissions reductions on the basis of national and sub-national
jurisdictions, as opposed to pure project-based accounting, combined
with the treatment of the forest sector as a source of emissions rather
than as a sink, allow for better integration with the existing regulatory
129. See Tata Cara Pengurangan Emisi Dari Deforestasi Dan Degradasi Hutan (REDD)
[Implementation Procedures for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation], No. P.30/Menhut-11/2009 (2009) (Indon.); Tata Cara Perizinan Usaha
Pemenfaatan Penyerapan Dan/Atau Penyimpanan Karbon Pada Hutan Produksi Dan Hutan
Lindung [Procedures for Licensing of Commercial Utilisation of Carbon Sequestration and/or
Storage in Production and Protected Forests], No. P.36/Menhut-11/2009 (2009) (Indon.).
130. See Lei No. 11.284, de 2 de margo de 2006, D.O.U. de 3.3.2006, art. 16, T1 (Braz.).
131. See Decreto No. 6.527, de lo de agosto de 2008, D.O.U. de 4.8.2008 (Braz.). For
background on the Amazon Fund, see http://www.amazonfund.gov.br/.
132. See Lula Signs Land Law Aimed at Reforming Amazon, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.comarticlelidUSTRE55P62M0090626.
133. The Brazilian state of Amazonas, for example, enacted the country's first state climate
change law, which, among other objectives, encourages "the creation of market instruments to
enable the execution of projects for reducing deforestation emissions." Lei sobre Mudangas
Climiticas, Conservapo Ambiental e Desenvolvimento Sustentdvel do Amazonas, PEMC-AM
[Law of Climate Change, Environmental Conservation, and Sustainable Development], State
Law No. 3135 (June 5, 2007) (State of Amazonas, Brazil) arts. 2(11) & 3(I).
134. See World Bank, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, About the FCPF, http://www.
forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/12 (last visited July 22, 2009).
135. See supra Part III.A.
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architecture of mitigation policy and its emphasis on baselines, caps,
emissions, and credits for reductions.136 Third, rather than follow the
failed Kyoto sequence, which sought to bring deforestation (and forest
carbon in general) into the climate regime after commitments had been
negotiated and agreed to, efforts to include forests in the post-2012
framework as well as in national and sub-national compliance regimes
have proceeded as part and parcel of the overall effort to agree on
reduction targets." Fourth, capabilities for measuring, monitoring, and
verifying reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
have improved significantly since Kyoto was negotiated, providing the
basis for far more confidence than a decade ago.138 Fifth, it has become
increasingly clear since deforestation was placed on the international
climate agenda in 2005 that it could be an important, perhaps crucial,
component of any overall political deal on a post-2012 agreement, by
breaking the Kyoto logjam over "common but differentiated
responsibilities" 3 9 and providing an avenue for developing countries to
move toward meaningful emissions reductions commitments.
In sum, there are many reasons why deforestation has emerged as a
prominent focus of climate policy in recent years, and there appears to be
considerable momentum behind the effort. One of the key claims made
by this Article is that the growing acceptance of the issue by
policymakers, experts, advocates, and civil society groups derives in part
from the increased stability and coherence of deforestation as an object
of climate governance. As the next Part will demonstrate, this novel
approach to global forest governance did not emerge overnight, but was
instead built up over decades on the basis of significant epistemological
investments-new ways of seeing capable of rendering the varied and
variable processes that constitute tropical deforestation comprehensible
for purposes of climate policy. These new ways of seeing, though not
sufficient by themselves to ensure the success of a climate policy
approach to tropical deforestation, provided a necessary foundation for
such efforts by creating the opportunity space (the conditions of
possibility) for policy solutions.
136. This basic point was emphasized in the original 2005 submission by Papua New Guinea
and Costa Rica: "It must be highlighted that our emphasis is carbon emissions-not 'sinks'." See
Submission by Papua New Guinea & Costa Rica, supra note 112, at 8; see also infra Part IV.C.
137. See supra Part III.B.
138. See infra Parts IV.B and C.
139. See UNFCCC, supra note 96, art. 3(1) ("The Parties should protect the climate
system . . . on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities."); see also Christopher D. Stone, Common But
Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 276 (2004).
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IV. MAKING DEFORESTATION AN OBJECT OF CLIMATE GOVERNANCE
Tropical deforestation had to be understood as part of the climate
problem before it could be approached as an object of climate
governance. Although this may seem obvious in the current context, the
discussion in Part II above makes clear that many of the previous
approaches to tropical deforestation-debt-for-nature, biodiversity, trade
and consumption, governance and institutions -rested on different ways
of seeing the problem. Each of these perspectives or framings has its own
validity in terms of mobilizing efforts to deal with the problem, but each
also leads to a distinctive emphasis and choice of policy instruments. As
indicated, moreover, even though the climate policy approach to the
deforestation problem has been percolating through the international
policy community for more than a decade," it has only recently begun to
attract significant attention and is still very much "under construction."
Emphasizing the manner in which tropical deforestation is being
made into an object of climate governance directs attention to the
knowledge practices and supporting infrastructures that create the
conceptual space for understanding and approaching the problem as one
that is amenable to a particular regulatory scheme. Rather than take the
climate approach to deforestation as self-evident and fully-formed, this
Article contends that the phenomena that comprise deforestation had to
be actively "formatted" as a coherent object of climate governance-a
process that required (and continues to require) significant investments,
and one that has important implications for the structure and practice not
only of climate policy but also of forest law and governance throughout
the world.
Such a perspective represents a departure from standard conceptions
of environmental problems in the environmental law and governance
literature, which tend to "naturalize" the problems targeted for
regulation rather than inquiring into how those problems get constructed
as coherent (or not so coherent) objects of governance in the first place.
Starting with the object of governance itself, unpacking it, and
investigating the history of how it came to be offers a novel approach to
the positive theory of environmental law that takes seriously the
constitutive role of key scientific and technical knowledge practices in
fashioning the subject matter of the field.
In the case of deforestation, two fundamental post-World War 11
developments in earth systems science provided the foundation for
viewing this as a climate problem: carbon cycle research and the
application of remote sensing techniques to global land cover change.
The first provided the basis for viewing tropical forests as an important
140. See supra Part II.
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component of the global carbon budget and, consequently, served to
highlight the role that tropical deforestation (and land-use change more
generally) played in global anthropogenic carbon emissions. This laid the
foundation for making deforestation into a particular kind of problem
(one amenable to global climate governance), illustrating the practice of
"kind-making" that will be discussed in Part V. The second key
development, remote sensing, allowed for the first truly synoptic view of
changes in forest cover, sometimes with dramatic effect as evidenced by
early satellite images of deforestation in the Amazon,141 establishing the
basis for visualizing forests as terrestrial carbon stocks and as components
of the earth's carbon budget. This provided for a new form of
"calculability," manifest most prominently in the generation of regional
and global mappings of forest carbon,142 that has worked to stabilize and
sustain deforestation as an object of climate governance. Together these
two developments proved instrumental in rendering the problem
comprehensible for purposes of climate governance.
But making deforestation an object of climate governance has also
required a third set of activities directed at translating forest carbon into
compliance carbon. This ongoing effort involves, among other things, the
construction and elaboration of key standards, accounting practices, and
legal and institutional infrastructures necessary to "package" forest
carbon as a fungible, compliance-grade asset. It involves, in other words,
the construction of an equivalence 43 between forest carbon and other
forms of compliance carbon.
141. See G.M. Woodwell et al., Deforestation in the Tropics: New Measurements in the
Amazon Basin Using Landsat and NOAA Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer Imagery,
92 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2157, 2157-58 (1987) (providing early images of deforestation in the
Brazilian Amazon using data from Landsat and the NOAA Advanced Very High Resolution
Radiometer Imagery satellites).
142. See, e.g., Gregory P. Asner, Tropical Forest Carbon Assessment: Integrating Satellite and
Airborne Mapping Approaches, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 2-6 (2009) (discussing opportunities
to combine satellite-based remote sensing with new airborne techniques for measuring carbon
densities to develop high-resolution forest carbon maps as a baseline for monitoring changes in
forest carbon stocks going forward). The Woods Hole Research Center has also initiated a
multi-year project to develop a pan-tropical map of forest cover and associated carbon stocks in
above-ground biomass with the express goal of providing reference maps for future REDD
policy mechanisms. See Woods Hole Research Center, Pan-Tropical Mapping of Forest Cover
and Above-Ground Carbon Stock, http://whrc.org/pantropicallindex.htm. Drawing on the work
of Asner and others, Google is developing a new platform that will enable "online, global-scale
observation and measurement of changes in the earth's forests" by running high-performance
processing of raw satellite data through the "Google cloud." According to Google, the new
technology will provide a low-cost, publicly available, and transparent tool for forest monitoring,
reporting and verification ("MRV") to support emerging REDD policy mechanisms. See
Google, Seeing the Forest Through the Cloud (Dec. 10, 2009), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2009/12/seeing-forest-through-cloud.htnil.
143. As used here, the term equivalence is intended to capture the various conventions and
techniques that allow seemingly disparate phenomena to be held together, creating "things of
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Taken together, these efforts to simplify, reduce, and translate
tropical forests into compliance carbon are putting significant pressure on
previous ways of conceiving and governing forests. In place of traditional
approaches to forests as sovereign national resources, forests are now
being approached as components of the global carbon cycle and as
providers of global public goods.'" By valorizing the carbon embodied in
the standing forest and decoupling it from the forest ecosystem, the
integration of forests into emerging GHG compliance regimes represents
a potentially fundamental transformation of the law governing forests at
multiple levels with significant implications for traditional understandings
of national territory and sovereign control of forest resources.
A. Tropical Forests and the Global Carbon Cycle
Research on the global carbon cycle during the post-World War II
period provided the conceptual foundations for understanding tropical
deforestation as a climate problem.'4 Chiefly concerned with
understanding and calculating the fluxes among various components of
the earth's carbon cycle-the atmosphere, oceans, and terrestrial
biota'"-early carbon cycle research rested on a crude understanding of
the role of forests in the earth's carbon budget, in large part because of
the dominance of geochemists in constructing early models and a strong
bias toward the ocean-atmosphere carbon exchange.147 Indeed, not until
the late 1970s did carbon cycle researchers begin to appreciate and
incorporate the role of land use in the global carbon cycle, largely as a
result of efforts by ecologists to refine the basic models with a better
another order." See ALAIN DESROSIkRES, THE POLITICS OF LARGE NUMBERS: A HISTORY OF
STATISTICAL REASONING 9 (Camille Naish trans., 1998).
144. See, e.g., PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
546-47 (2d ed. 2003) ("Attempts by developed countries to 'internationalize' forest issues have
so far been unsuccessful in legal terms, and the tropical forest resources of developing countries
are carefully guarded as part of the national patrimony of these countries . . . . [T]ropical and
other forests are not the 'common heritage of mankind' under international law, and were not
identified as a 'common concern' to mankind in the forest principles."). Although the current
international discussions over REDD have not proposed a specific change in the treatment of
tropical forests under international law, it is clear that bringing tropical forests into an
international climate regime will increase the pressure for a de facto internationalization of
tropical forests given their role in the global carbon cycle and their importance to climate
protection efforts.
145. See David M. Hart & David G. Victor, Scientific Elites and the Making of US Policy for
Climate Change Research, 1957-74, 23 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 643, 647 (1993) (describing the
evolution of a coherent climate change research program in the post World War II period as the
product of two distinct discourses: one focused on the carbon cycle and the other on atmospheric
modeling).
146. Id. at 654.
147. See R.A. Houghton, Balancing the Global Carbon Budget, 35 ANN. REV. EARTH &
PLANETARY SCI. 313, 314-15 (2007).
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understanding of terrestrial carbon dynamics. 14 8 By the early 1980s, with
growing international attention to the scale and scope of tropical
deforestation, a number of ecologists began to argue for including
emissions from deforestation and land use in models of the global carbon
budget,'49 leading to an extended controversy between geochemists and
ecologists over the role of the terrestrial biota in the global carbon
cycle.so Suffice it to say that the ecologists prevailed. George Woodwell,
one of the leading scientists urging climate modelers to attend to the
importance of deforestation, summed up the situation in the early 1990s:
"The special insight of the 1980s is that forests globally are much more
important in determining the composition of the atmosphere on a year-
to-year basis than climatologists, oceanographers, and others involved in
anticipating climatic changes have recognized.""' This way of seeing
tropical forests as a key component of the global carbon budget
represented a crucial conceptual advance in the effort to make
deforestation into a particular kind of problem-one of global climate
governance -illustrating the powerful influence of systems thinking in
the post-World War II earth sciences.'52
Based on this understanding and in light of the high "carbon density"
of tropical forests relative to other forms of land cover (forests contain
twenty to one hundred times more carbon per unit area than agricultural
148. See, e.g., Bert Bolin, Changes of Land Biota and Their Importance for the Carbon
Cycle, 196 SCIENCE 613, 613 (1977) ("Deforestation and the cultivation of land for agricultural
purposes are examples of major changes in the land biota that may well have had significant
implications for the global carbon cycle."); Eberhard F. Brunig, The Tropical Rain Forest-A
Wasted Asset or an Essential Biospheric Resource?, 6 AMBlO 187, 190 (1977) ("If forest is
converted to vegetation cover types witb lower biomass accumulation, large amounts of carbon
dioxide will be released into the atmosphere and part of it will stay there."); G.M. Woodwell et
al., The Biota and the World Carbon Budget, 199 SCIENCE 141, 141 (1978) (concluding on the
basis of convergent lines of evidence that the terrestrial biota operate as a significant source of
CO, emissions to the atmosphere).
149. See G.M. Woodwell et al., Global Deforestation: Contribution to Atmospheric Carbon
Dioxide, 222 SCIENCE 1081, 1085 (1983) (concluding that "[tihe biotic release of carbon dioxide
to the atmosphere is large . . . [such that] its management will affect the CO2 content of the
atmosphere appreciably").
150. See John Hobbie et al., Role of Biota in Global CO2 Balance: The Controversy, 34
BIOSCIENCE 492 (1984) (discussing controversy between geochemists and ecologists regarding
the role of terrestrial biota in the global carbon cycle and the contributions of deforestation to
global carbon emissions).
151. George M. Woodwell, Forests in a Warming World: A Time for New Policies, 19
CLIMATIC CHANGE 245, 245 (1991).
152. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Heaven and Earth: The Politics of Environmental Images, in
EARTHLY POLITICS 31, 44-45 (Sheila Jasanoff & Marybeth Long Martello eds., 2004)
[hereinafter Jasanoff, Heaven and Earth] (discussing post-World War II developments in earth
systems science and the resulting effort to develop a new kind of legibility capable of generating
"facts on a planetary scale"); Peter J. Taylor, Technocratic Optimism, H.T. Odum, and the
Partial Transformation of the Ecological Metaphor after World War II, 21 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 213,
214 (1988) (discussing early work on biogeochemical cycles in development of systems approach
within ecology and the earth sciences).
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lands),"' it was clear that the ongoing conversion of tropical forests to
agriculture and pasture was releasing significant amounts of carbon to the
atmosphere, either rapidly through burning or more slowly through
decay." Under one "business-as-usual" scenario from 1990, tropical
forests were projected to be "virtually eliminated from the earth in the
next 50 to 100 years," releasing vast amounts of carbon to the
atmosphere.' From the perspective of the global carbon cycle, this
meant that policies intended to stabilize the concentration of CO2 in the
atmosphere would have to account for emissions from deforestation.15 6
Such lessons were not lost on the newly formed Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), which released its first set of assessments in
1990."' These reports recognized the importance of tropical deforestation
as a source of global anthropogenic GHG emissions (perhaps as much as
20-25 percent) and identified a World Forest Conservation Protocol to a
climate treaty as a possible policy response."' Subsequent IPCC
assessments have elaborated on the role of forests in the carbon cycle,
confirming the overall contribution of deforestation to global climate
change, with the most recent assessment estimating the emissions from
tropical deforestation in the 1990s at 1.6 gigatonnes of carbon per year,
accounting for roughly 20 percent of total anthropogenic emissions
during that time period.'59 Given the vast amount of carbon stored in
153. See Valentin Bellassen et al., Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation:
What Contribution from Carbon Markets?, 6 IOP CONF. SERIES 252020, 252026 (2009).
154. See Richard A. Houghton, The Future Role of Tropical Forests in Affecting the Carbon
Dioxide Concentration of the Atmosphere, 19 AMBio 204, 204 (1990) (noting that carbon
emissions from deforestation in the 1980s were on the order of 35 percent to 50 percent of global
emissions from combustion of fossil fuels).
155. Id. at 209.
156. Id. ("Policies to stabilize the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, if the
stabilization is to last into the indefinite future, must include three measures: a reduction of
fossil-fuel use, a cessation of deforestation, and an initiation of reforestation.").
157. See IPCC, SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: REPORT OF WORKING
GROUP I (1990); IPCC, IMPACTS ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: REPORT OF WORKING
GROUP 11 (1990); IPCC, THtE IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP III
(1990).
158. See R.T. Watson et al., Greenhouse Gases and Aerosols, in CLIMATE CHANGE: THE
IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT: WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIRST ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 13 (J.T. Houghton,
G.J. Jenkins & J.J. Ephraums eds., 1990) [hereinafter Greenhouse Gases and Aerosols, 1990
IPCC REPORTI (estimating emissions from deforestation and land use during the 1980s at 1.6 &
1.0 GtC/yr and emissions from fossil fuels at 5.4 ± 0.5 GtC/yr, with the result that deforestation
and land use accounted for some 22 percent of global anthropogenic carbon emissions); see also
IPCC, THE IPCC RESPONSE STRATEGIES: REPORT OF WORKING GROUP III 94 (1990)
("Deforestation may be responsible for one-quarter to one-fifth of global anthropogenic carbon
dioxide emissions . . . ."); id. at 103-04 (identifying a World Forest Conservation Protocol to a
climate convention as a possible response option).
159. K.L. DENMAN ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS:
WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL OF CLIMATE CHANGE 518 tbl.7.2 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC WG I
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tropical forests-between 212 and 340 billion metric tons in above-
ground biomass, which is equivalent to more than 20-30 times total
global anthropogenic CO2 emissions in 2008 1s-finding ways to maintain
that carbon in the terrestrial biosphere and keep it from leaking into the
atmosphere has emerged as an obvious and urgent part of the climate
challenge.
To be sure, there are still considerable uncertainties associated with
the actual role of tropical forests in the global carbon budget,161 a
reflection of the fact that this is still very much an object "under
construction," with scientific and technical work proceeding to further
refine and stabilize the basic understanding and render it comprehensible
for climate governance. Such uncertainties stem from the heterogeneity
of aboveground biomass,162 the complex biology underlying carbon
storage in soilsl 63  varying rates of deforestation," difficulties in
accounting for vegetation re-growth and/or re-clearing,165 the fate of
carbon that is removed from the land," effects of past land-use change, 67
REPORT]. This estimate was the same as that provided in the first IPCC report in 1990.
Greenhouse Gases and Aerosols, 1990 IPCC REPORT, supra note 158, at 13. The range of
uncertainty reported in the 2007 report was also comparable to that from the first report. Id. at
13 (reporting its range of uncertainty as ± 1.1, while the 2007 IPCC WG I REPORT, supra, stated
its range of uncertainty as ± 1.0).
160. 2001 IPCC REPORT, supra note 86, at 192 tbl.3.2. Global anthropogenic CO, emissions
for 2008 are estimated at 9.9 billion metric tons of carbon. See Le Qu6r6 et al., supra note 4, at
832.
161. R.A. Houghton, Balancing the Global Carbon Budget, 35 ANN. REV. EARTH &
PLANETARY Sci. 313, 314 (2007) [hereinafter Houghton, Balancing the Global Carbon Budget]
("The global carbon cycle is critical to [climate stabilization] because its processes define how
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO) from anthropogenic activities translate into concentrations in
the atmosphere."); Navin Ramankutty et al., Challenges to Estimating Carbon Emissions from
Tropical Deforestation, 13 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 51, 51 (2007) ("Emissions from land-use
and land-cover change are perhaps the most uncertain component of the global carbon cycle,
with enormous implications for balancing the present-day carbon budget and predicting the
future evolution of climate change."); IPCC WG I REPORT, supra note 159, at 518 ("The land
use carbon source has the largest uncertainties in the global carbon budget.").
162. D. Schimel et al., CO, and the Carbon Cycle, in CLIMATE CHANGE 1994: RADIATIVE
FORCING OF CLIMATE CHANGE 51 (R.A. Houghton et al. eds., 1995); R.A. Houghton,
Aboveground Forest Biomass and the Global Carbon Balance, 11 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY
945, 945 (2005); see also R.A. Houghton et al., The Spatial Distribution of Forest Biomass in the
Brazilian Amazon: A Comparison of Estimates, 7 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 731, 731 (2001)
("The lack of agreement among estimates confirms the need for reliable determination of
aboveground biomass over large areas."); Ramankutty et al., supra note 161, at 55
("[U]ncertainty in biomass estimates has been a key source of disagreement regarding estimates
of carbon emissions from tropical deforestation.").
163. See Ramankutty et al., supra note 161, at 55, 57; see also IPCC WG III REPORT, supra
note 4, at 544 ("There is still limited insight regarding impacts [of climate change] on soils").
164. Ramankutty et al., supra note 161, at 51, 53-54; R.A. Houghton, Aboveground Forest
Biomass and the Global Carbon Balance, 11 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 945, 945 (2005).
165. Ramankutty et al., supra note 161, at 55.
166. Id. at 56.
167. Id. at 58.
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and potential feedback effects from rising temperatures and increasing
atmospheric CO2 concentrations" -all of which raise the question of
whether terrestrial carbon can be understood and rendered calculable
with sufficient accuracy for climate policy and emerging GHG
compliance regimes.
Notwithstanding such challenges, however, there is little question
that carbon cycle research, as part of the broader agenda of earth systems
science that has come of age during the post-World War II period, has
proved instrumental in re-framing forests as components of the global
carbon cycle. This new way of seeing necessarily resulted in a radical
simplification of diverse tropical forest ecosystems to their functional,
aggregated role in carbon cycling (forests collectively became a box or
sub-unit in the larger terrestrial carbon budget, which was itself a box or
sub-unit in the larger global carbon budget) 69 and laid the groundwork
for making forest carbon a new object of environmental governance,
illustrating the fundamental role of "kind-making" in environmental law.
As the most recent IPCC report summed up the matter: "Forest clearing
(mainly in the tropics) is a large contributor to the land use change
component of the current atmospheric CO2 budget, accounting for up to
one-third of total anthropogenic emissions . . . . The future evolution of
this term in the CO2 budget is therefore of critical importance."'
Although such a statement may seem obvious today, at least to some, it
rests on a distinctive way of seeing that took years, even decades, to
cultivate and one that has profound implications for climate governance.
B. Remote Sensing and the Synoptic Gaze
If carbon cycle research provided the conceptual foundation for
reframing tropical deforestation as an object of climate governance,
remote sensing has provided the ability to view and assess changes in
forest cover on a global scale, offering a previously unavailable synoptic
view of tropical deforestation."' This move toward a truly global
168. See IPCC WG I REPORT, supra note 159, at 604-)5; IPCC WG III REPORT, supra note
4, at 564; Christopher B. Field et al., Feedbacks of Terrestrial Ecosystems to Climate Change, 32
ANN. REV. ENv'T & RES. 1 (2007); Christian Kbrner, Through Enhanced Tree Dynamics Carbon
Dioxide Enrichment May Cause Tropical Forests to Lose Carbon, 359 PHIL. TRANSAcTIONS
ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON B 493 (2004).
169. See e.g., Houghton, Balancing the Global Carbon Budget, supra note 161, at 316 fig.1
(illustrating role of vegetation and land use change in global carbon cycle).
170. IPCC WG I REPORT, supra note 159, at 527.
171. See, e.g., Ruth DeFries, Terrestrial Vegetation in the Coupled Human-Earth System:
Contributions of Remote Sensing, 33 ANN. REV. ENV'T & RES. 369, 383 (2008) [hereinafter
DeFries, Terrestrial Vegetation in the Coupled Human-Earth System] (discussing the role of
remote sensing in transforming understandings of terrestrial vegetation in the earth system); Eli
Kintisch, Improved Monitoring of Rainforests Helps Pierce Haze of Deforestation, 316 SCIENCE
536 (2007); Carlos M. Souza, Jr., Mapping Land Use of Tropical Regions from Space, 103 PROC.
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perspective resonates in very direct ways with earlier forest inventory
practices that sought to develop a quantitative or statistical "picturing" of
forest resources over large geographic areas. 17 2 As such, it represents a
new round in the effort to reformat the forest as an object of
calculation-a new way of seeing that promises to serve as a foundational
tool for the emerging agenda of earth systems governance.
The goal of such a synoptic view, of course, had long been apparent
to those concerned with the scientific management of forests and land
use. Starting in the 1930s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture deployed
aerial photography to monitor agricultural lands for purposes of
administering farm programs, and by the late 1940s, aerial photography
was providing the basis for forest and rangeland inventories in the United
States."' During the early 1960s, the development of multi-spectral
sensing capabilities and digitalization, which allowed for computer-based
processing of remote sensing data, provided more accurate and timely
information regarding the state of forests. 7 4 By 1972, with the launch of
the first Landsat satellite (Landsat 1), the modern era of remote sensing
had arrived." Application of these new satellite-based capabilities to
forest assessments soon followed, providing levels of accuracy that
matched field measurements, but at far lower cost. 176
During the early 1980s, researchers began using satellite data to
assess the state of tropical forests.'77 Given the enormous and largely
inaccessible areas covered by these forests, satellite-based remote sensing
provided the only realistic tool for doing such assessments, offering
"simple, objective techniques of measurement that can be applied over
large areas."7 7 By the 1990s, remote sensing capabilities were being
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 14261 (2006); Ruth DeFries et al., Carbon Emissions from Tropical
Deforestation and Regrowth Based on Satellite Observations for the 1980s and 1990s, 99 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 14256 (2002).
172. See Demeritt, supra note 44, at 433.
173. See Daniel B. Botkin et al., Studying the Earth's Vegetation from Space, 34 BIOSCIENCE
508, 510 (1984).
174. See id.
175. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE: HISTORY,
PROMISE, AND REALITY 16 (1995); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EARTH SCIENCE AND
APPLICATIONS FROM SPACE: URGENT NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES TO SERVE THE NATION 21
(2005); Botkin et al., supra note 173, at 510.
176. Botkin et al., supra note 173, at 510-11. In 1990, Finland became the first country to use
Landsat imagery as the basis for country-wide mapping of forest variables in its National Forest
Inventory. See Heather Reese et al., Countrywide Estimates of Forest Variables Using Satellite
Data and Field Data from the National Forest Inventory, 32 AMBIO 542, 542 (2003).
177. See G.M. Woodwell et al., Measurement of Changes in the Vegetation of the Earth by
Satellite Imagery, in THE ROLE OF TERRESTRIAL VEGETATION IN THE GLOBAL CARBON
CYCLE: MEASUREMENT BY REMOTE SENSING 221 (G.M. Woodwell ed., 1984).
178. See, e.g., G.M. Woodwell et al., Deforestation in the Tropics: New Measurements in the
Amazon Basin Using Landsat and NOAA Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer Imagery,
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widely deployed to monitor deforestation and land cover change in the
tropics, with the first comprehensive global and pan-tropical maps based
on remote sensing data released in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 7 9 From
the start, these efforts to map tropical deforestation were directed at
developing an improved understanding of the role of tropical
deforestation (and terrestrial vegetation in general) in the global carbon
cycle," reinforcing the view of many ecologists that land use and
deforestation were important sources of global GHG emissions.
As part of the broader trend toward satellite-based earth observation
that began in the post-World War II period (in part as a product of Cold
War rivalries) and has emerged in recent decades as a key component of
earth systems science, the deployment of these capabilities to monitor the
terrestrial biosphere is underwriting the effort to develop global
institutions capable of managing various aspects of earth's
biogeochemical cycles-what might be called earth systems
governance.18' By creating "facts on a planetary scale," remote sensing
92 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2157, 2159-62 (1987) (discussing results of efforts to use satellite
imagery to assess deforestation in the Amazon).
179. See William Booth, Monitoring the Fate of Forests from Space, 243 SCIENCE 1428, 1428
(1989) (reporting on calls from ecologists and remote sensing experts to develop and apply
worldwide, "wall-to-wall" systematic assessment of deforestation); Philippe Mayaux et al.,
Tropical Forest Cover Change in the 1990s and Options for Future Monitoring, 360 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y B 373, 374-75 (2005) (discussing remote sensing initiatives in the
early 1990s to establish a reliable baseline inventory of tropical forest resources and cataloguing
main global land-cover maps derived from remote sensing data).
180. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE: THE
FIRST 50 YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS 73 (2008) [hereinafter EARTH OBSERVATIONS
FROM SPACE] ("For the first time, remote sensing made direct global observations of
photosynthesis, plant growth, and ecosystem phenology possible, leading to the evolution of a
global perspective on ecology."); THE ROLE OF TERRESTRIAL VEGETATION IN THE GLOBAL
CARBON CYCLE: MEASUREMENT BY REMOTE SENSING, supra note 177, at 7-8.
181. See, e.g., EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 180, at 1 (discussing the
launch of Sputnik in 1957 as a transformative moment for earth systems science, ushering in an
era of space-based observations "that have fundamentally altered our understanding of the
planet"); HAROLD A. MOONEY, THE GLOBALIZATION OF ECOLOGICAL THOUGHT 49 (1998)
(characterizing remote sensing as "[o]ne of the foremost technological advances in recent
decades" in terms of "the amount and quality of information on Earth System processes, at
frequent intervals, and at many scales of resolution"); see also William C. Clark et al., Evaluating
the Influence of Global Environmental Assessments, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENTS: INFORMATION AND INFLUENCE 2-6 (Ronald B. Mitchell et al. eds., 2006)
(discussing growth and influence of large scale "global environmental assessments" over the last
several decades as important components of international environmental governance); William
C. Clark et al., Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion, and Climate Change: An Historical Overview, in 1
LEARNING TO MANAGE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF
SOCIAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION, AND ACID RAIN 22-26 (Social
Learning Group eds., 2001) (describing evolution of knowledge of the earth system during the
twentieth century and the related efforts to "manage" global environmental problems). On the
concept of "earth systems governance," see supra note 7. See also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF GLOBAL CHANGE: INITIAL PRIORITIES FOR U.S.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL GEOSPHERE-BIOSPHERE PROGRAM 2 (1988) ("[T]he
2010] WAYS OF SEEING 887
allows particular environmental problems to be understood and
approached in ways (and at scales) that differ significantly from previous
approaches." This fundamentally new way of seeing has profoundly
altered our ability to visualize tropical deforestation and land cover
change, providing the basis for a comprehensive, global mapping of forest
carbon stocks-a new round in the simplification of forest ecosystems to
calculable objects on a global scale.183
Of course, the accurate assessment of emissions from deforestation
requires more than space-based observation of changes in forest cover; it
also requires quantification of the forest carbon stocks associated with
changes in forest cover." Because carbon density" varies among
different forest types and conditions, field measurements are needed to
calibrate or "ground truth" satellite images and translate them into an
overall map of forest carbon stocks.'" In the absence of extensive field-
based forest inventories, which do not exist in many tropical countries,
the IPCC has published guidelines for forest carbon accounting based on
a default forest classification system that can be refined and elaborated as
countries develop additional capabilities." At the same time, new active
remote sensing applications, based on laser technology known as
prediction and ultimate management of environmental problems inescapably require
development of a new earth system science aimed to improve understanding of the earth as an
integrated whole.").
182. See Jasanoff, Heaven and Earth, supra note 152, at 44-45.
183. See, e.g., EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 180, at 84 ("The advent of
satellite data has revolutionized our ability to characterize global land cover and monitor land-
use patterns. Satellite sensors offer a synoptic view of Earth, as well as the objectivity associated
with a consistent measurement and methodology for mapping the entire planet.").
184. See IPCC, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE FOR LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE, AND
FORESTRY 3.15 (Jim Penman et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter IPCC GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE];
GOFC-GOLD, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND
DEGRADATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SOURCEBOOK OF METHODS AND
PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING, MEASURING, AND REPORTING, GOFC-GOLD Report
Version COP14-2, 1-11 to -13 (2009) [hereinafter GOFC-GOLD SOURCEBOOK] (summarizing
general methodologies for estimating CO, emissions from deforestation and discussing the IPCC
approach).
185. Carbon density refers to the amount of carbon per unit area, often expressed in tons of
carbon per hectare.
186. See Asner, supra note 142, at 2 ("Satellites thus provide an opportunity to measure
changes in forest carbon caused by deforestation and forest degradation but only if carbon
densities have been assessed. Traditionally, carbon densities have been assessed using field-
based inventory plots, which are valuable but also expensive, time-consuming and inherently
limited in geographic representativeness.... New approaches are needed to extend field plot
networks, and to bridge the gap between field measurements and satellite observations.").
187. See IPCC GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 184; IPCC, 2006 IPCC GUIDELINES
FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES (Simon Eggleston et al. eds., 2006)
[hereinafter 2006 IPCC GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES]; see
also Ruth DeFries et al., Earth Observations for Estimating Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Deforestation in Developing Countries, 10 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 385, 390 (2007) [hereinafter
DeFries et al., Earth Observations for Estimating Greenhouse Gas Emissions].
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LIDAR,"M provide a basis for three-dimensional inventories of forest
biomass and a possible technique for sampling across large, inaccessible
areas in tropical forest countries that lack traditional forest inventory
systems. 18
Given their many advantages, remote sensing capabilities are now
being actively deployed in a number of countries for the express purpose
of quantifying changes in forest cover (and forest carbon).'" A majority
of Annex I industrialized countries, for example, are using remote
sensing techniques as a basis for their terrestrial carbon accounting in
their national GHG inventory reports under the UNFCCC and, in some
cases, as a basis for their own GHG compliance systems.19' Australia, in
particular, has developed what is widely viewed as the most advanced
terrestrial carbon accounting system in the world, the National Carbon
Accounting System (NCAS), based on extensive use of remote sensing
and geo-referenced mapping capabilities.'9 2 Among non-Annex I
countries, Brazil has developed some of the most sophisticated
capabilities in the world for monitoring changes in forest cover. The
Brazilian National Space Agency (INPE), for example, released its first
report on deforestation in 1978 and has been producing comprehensive
annual reports on the extent and rate of deforestation in the Amazon
using a consistent methodology since 1988.'9' Results of the analysis of
satellite imagery are published every year and made available to the
public on the INPE website.'94 Brazil has also developed a satellite-based
188. Light Detection and Ranging ("LIDAR") sensors use lasers to measure the three-
dimensional distribution of vegetation, allowing for characterization of forest structure, which
can be used as a basis for estimating forest biomass (carbon) over large areas. See GOFC-GOLD
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 184, at 2-107 to -108.
189. See id. at 2-107 to -110 (discussing advances in LIDAR applications to forest
monitoring and its potential deployment as an alternative method of field measurements to
assess forest biomass); see also Asner, supra note 142, at 1-10 (discussing use of LIDAR
mapping techniques that, when combined with field calibration plots, can be used to generate
aboveground carbon maps over very large areas, at relatively low cost and at high levels of
accuracy). As discussed above, these capabilities are now being integrated into an online,
transparent, publicly available platform that will use the Google "cloud" to "enable global-scale
observation and measurement of changes in the earth's forests." See Google, supra note 142.
190. See, e.g., FREDtRIC ACHARD ET AL., GOFC-GOLD REPORT NO. 33, USE OF REMOTE
SENSING IN LULUCF SECTOR, at 7 (May 2008) (reporting that 60 percent of Annex I countries
reported the use of remote sensing techniques in compiling their GHG inventories).
191. See id.
192. See Australian Gov't, Dep't of Climate Change, Nat'1 Carbon Accounting Sys.,
http://www.climatechange.gov.au/ncas/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2009); GOFC-GOLD SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 184, at 3-130 to -131 (describing the Australian NCAS).
193. See ACHARD ET AL., supra note 190, at 18 (quoting Brazilian official on the importance
of space-based monitoring of land use change: "a task which could never be conducted without
the use of space technology").
194. See id. INPE has also adopted a policy of open access to all remote sensing data,
resulting maps, and software. See Hilc6a Santos Ferreira & Gilberto Cfimara, Current Status and
Recent Developments in Brazilian Remote Sensing Law, 34 J. SPACE L. 11, 15 (2008) (describing
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early warning system, DETER, which provides almost real-time
information on significant deforestation events.195 Taken together, these
various national-level activities can be seen as elements of an emerging
socio-technical infrastructure for bringing forest cover under continuous
observation, with the express aim of rendering forests calculable for
emerging GHG compliance systems.
Building on these important national activities, a concerted
international effort has emerged over the last decade to coordinate and
facilitate the application of remote sensing to deforestation, with the
express purpose of informing climate policy. The Global Observation of
Forest and Land Cover Dynamics (GOFC-GOLD) initiative, which was
established in the late 1990s as a network of international organizations,
national space agencies, forestry experts, remote sensing scientists, and
NGOs convened under the auspices of the FAO's Global Terrestrial
Observing System (GTOS), 1" is "coordinat[ing] international efforts ...
to provide ongoing space-based and in-situ observations of forests and
other vegetation cover, for the sustainable management of terrestrial
resources and to obtain an accurate, reliable, quantitative understanding
of the terrestrial carbon budget."" These efforts are feeding directly into
the ongoing United Nations climate discussions on REDD, with
particular attention to the technical tools, methodologies, and related
institutions needed to operationalize a national accounting approach to
emissions from deforestation that comports with existing emissions
inventory practices in other sectors.198 The overall goal is to provide the
infrastructure for integrating these emissions into the post-2012 climate
regime,1" illustrating the importance of emerging transnational networks
INPE's de facto data policy of providing free access on the internet to "all remote sensing data
received by INPE, the resulting maps, and the software for image processing and GIS").
195. See CoordenaqAo-Geral de Observaqdl da Terra, Sistema DETER, http://www.
obt.inpe.br/deter/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2009).
196. See GOFC-GOLD, http://www.fao.org/gtos/gofc-gold/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2009).
197. See GOFC-GOLD, Overview, http://www.fao.org/GTOS/gofc-gold/overview.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2009).
198. See MARTIN HEROLD ET AL., GOFC-GOLD REPORT NO. 30, REPORT OF THE 2ND
GOFC-GOLD WORKSHOP ON TROPICAL DEFORESTATION iii (2007) ("The GOFC-GOLD
network has emerged as an important expert forum to provide information and technical
guidance on how remote sensing tools and methods, coupled with ground/based inventories, can
support policies to monitor and reduce . . . emissions [from deforestation].").
199. See GOFC-GOLD, Working Group on Earth Observations for Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation, http://www.gofc-gold.uni-jena.de/sites/deforest.php (last visited Sept. 3,
2009); see generally GTOS/GOFC-GOLD, SUBMISSION TO UNFCCC ON THE ISSUE FOR
REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (RED-DC) (2007);
RUTH DEFRIES ET AL., GOFC-GOLD REPORT NO. 26, REPORT OF THE GLOBAL TERRESTRIAL
OBSERVING SYSTEM [GTOS] No. 46, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM




of expertise in constituting global environmental governance regimes.o
To that effect, the GOFC-GOLD network recently released a
"'consensus" statement from the earth observation community concluding
that "[a]nalysis of remotely sensed data . . . is the only practical approach
to measure changes in forest area in developing countries at national
scales . . . [andi [slince the early 1990s, changes in forest cover can be
measured from space with confidence."20 1 When combined with existing
IPCC guidelines for forest carbon classification and enhanced capabilities
for carbon density assessment, this effort provides a possible platform for
bringing deforestation into the climate regime in a manner that was not
possible during the Kyoto negotiations a decade ago.20
At the same time, new image processing techniques have been
developed that allow for better quantification of emissions from forest
degradation, a phenomenon that is much harder to measure than
deforestation but that contributes significantly to GHG emissions from
the sector.' Likewise, a number of new "active" remote sensing
applications are emerging that hold great promise for further reducing
uncertainties associated with efforts to measure and monitor forest loss
and forest carbon from space. In 2006, the Japanese Space Agency
launched a radar-based earth-observing satellite, the Advanced Land
Observing Satellite, which deploys advanced imaging radar sensors
capable of providing "wall-to-wall" high resolution cloud-free image data
day or night. 204 Similarly, new laser-based systems are being deployed on
a trial basis in several countries, holding considerable promise for
improved sampling of forest carbon inventories over large areas. 205 The
200. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An
Update, 2 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 211 (2006) (discussing the role of transnational regulatory
networks in global governance).
201. GTOS/GOFC-GOLD, SUBMISSION TO UNFCCC ON THE ISSUE FOR REDUCING
EMISSIONS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (RED-DC) (2007); see also DeFries et al., supra
note 187, at 386.
202. See supra Part II.B.
203. See Lisa M. Curran & Simon N. Trigg, Sustainability Science from Space: Quantifying
Forest Disturbance and Land-Use Dynamics in the Amazon, 103 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 12663,
12663-64 (2006) (describing Carnegie Land Analysis System (CLAS) for assessing forest
degradation as a "tremendous breakthrough" offering "enhanced governance capabilities,
refined regional carbon emissions estimates, and better understanding of the complex drivers of
deforestation from logging and road access"); see also Gregory P. Asner et al., Condition and
Fate of Logged Forests in the Brazilian Amazon, 103 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 12947, 12947
(2006) (describing the CLAS approach and applying it to selective logging in the Brazilian
Amazon).
204. See Woods Hole Research Center, Presentation at the UNFCCC COP-13 in Bali,
Indonesia: New Eyes in the Sky: Cloud-Free Tropical Forest Monitoring for REDD with the
Japanese Advanced Land Observing Satellite (ALOS) (Dec. 2007).
205. GOFC-GOLD SOURCEBOOK, supra note 184, at 2-107 to -110 (discussing LIDAR
applications for forest carbon assessment needs); Asner, supra note 142 (discussing integration
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ultimate goal is to develop a technology platform capable of monitoring
changes in forest carbon stocks on a continuous basis over continental
scales at low cost.
Like the "statistical picturing" efforts that drove forest inventories
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 2% these new
visualization capabilities allow for a new form of calculability that
reduces tropical forests to their embodied carbon and their functional
role in the global carbon cycle. By providing previously unavailable
national, "wall-to-wall" views of deforestation since the mid-1990s,
remote sensing allows deforestation, and its accompanying emissions, to
be monitored at national scales in a manner that was simply not possible
a decade ago.2' As one remote sensing expert put it: "The synoptic view
from remote sensing has transformed the perceived role of terrestrial
vegetation in the [Earth] system. Rather than a site-specific characteristic
studied at the plot level, the global role of vegetation in carbon, water,
and energy exchanges is now the norm in Earth system models." 20 In
sum, this emerging remote sensing infrastructure has "fundamentally
altered the capacity to observe and monitor land change,"209 providing a
basis for constructing new regulatory and management strategies to
integrate terrestrial carbon into global climate governance.210
C. Translating Forest Carbon into Compliance Carbon
Conceptual advances in global carbon cycle research and an
increasingly sophisticated ability to monitor forest and land cover change
from space have provided the intellectual and technical tools necessary to
see forests both as an important reservoir of carbon and as a large source
of carbon emissions, as well as an unprecedented ability to grasp
of LIDAR mapping techniques with satellite-based remote sensing to provide a platform for
tropical forest carbon assessment).
206. See Demeritt, supra note 44, at 433.
207. DeFries et al., Earth Observations for Estimating Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra
note 187, at 389 ("High resolution data with nearly complete global coverage are available at low
or no cost for early 1990s and early 2000s . . . . These data serve a key role in establishing
historical deforestation rates.").
208. DeFries, Terrestrial Vegetation in the Coupled Human-Earth System, supra note 171, at
383.
209. B.L. Turner et al., The Emergence of Land Change Science for Global Environmental
Change and Sustainability, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 20666, 20666 (2007).
210. To date, only a few environmental law scholars have focused on the role of remote
sensing in environmental governance. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the
Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 115, 156-57 (2004) (discussing the role of remote sensing in
environmental monitoring); Kenneth J. Markowitz, Legal Challenges and Market Rewards to the
Use and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y F. 219, 219-20 (2002) ("Satellite remote sensing and digital systems, including
geographic information systems (GIS), provide powerful tools for visualizing and solving
complex legal and environmental problems.").
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changing patterns of forest cover on a global scale. These developments
have provided much of the foundation for efforts to make deforestation
into a coherent object of climate governance. But such efforts also
depend on the ability to translate forest carbon into compliance carbon.
That is, they depend on the ability to construct an equivalence between
reduced emissions from deforestation and other emissions reductions that
comports with larger carbon accounting frameworks in emerging GHG
compliance regimes.211 This sort of exercise is endemic to climate policy,
from the construction of GHG inventories and registries to the
development of specific protocols, standards, and criteria that allow
emissions of different greenhouse gases from different sectors and
activities to be reduced to a common unit. As Professors Jim Salzman and
J.B. Ruhl point out, the effort to develop an appropriate "currency" for
ensuring fungibility is also deeply embedded in efforts to construct
environmental trading markets in a whole host of areas, as well as in
other "non-market" areas of environmental law such as comparative risk
assessment.212
The problem of equivalence is particularly challenging in the effort
to assimilate forest carbon into GHG compliance systems. Indeed, efforts
to bring forests into climate policy under the Kyoto Protocol have long
struggled with the challenges of translating forest carbon into compliance
carbon.213 From the development of elaborate accounting rules for GHG
inventory reporting in the land use and forest sector for the Annex I
parties214 to a whole new class of temporary emissions credits for forest
sector projects under the CDM,"' forest carbon has never fit comfortably
within the Kyoto regime.
211. This notion of equivalence borrows from DESROSItRES, supra note 143, at 324
(discussing the instrumental role of "the construction of equivalence spaces" in creating and
elaborating statistical systems).
212. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 30, at 611-13, 625 (emphasizing the importance of
currency selection for the "structure and effectiveness" of environmental trading markets); see
also Carol M. Rose, From HO to CO, Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L.
REv. 91, 105 (2008) ("[E]fforts to improve the precision of property rights limit their alienability.
Imprecise proxies may be more easily traded, but they fail to account for the externalities that
will occur if the right is exercised in some new way or at some new location or some different
time."). Salzman and Ruhl also point out that the challenges associated with the effort to
account for "trades of nonfungible commodities . . . seem remarkably similar to those faced by
practitioners of cost-benefit analysis and comparative risk assessment." See Salzman & Ruhi,
supra note 30, at 632.
213. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of some of the technical challenges associated with
the effort to bring forests into the Kyoto Protocol.
214. See IPCC, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 184; IPCC, 2006 IPCC
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES, supra note 187.
215. UNFCCC, Decision 19/CP.9: Modalities and Procedures for Afforestation and
Reforestation Project Activities under the Clean Development Mechanism in the First




The effort to bring REDD into climate policy faces similar
challenges, requiring among other things a set of common standards for
defining what constitutes a forest and what counts as deforestation;
accepted procedures and protocols for monitoring, measuring, and
verifying changes in land cover and associated carbon stocks; and a set of
conversion factors for translating changes in forest carbon and/or avoided
emissions to compliance-grade emissions reductions.216 Although this
may seem a purely technical exercise, such practices play a fundamental
role in many areas of climate policy and environmental regulation more
generally. In particular, the success of various markets for environmental
services or benefits often depends upon these basic questions of
equivalence. 2 17 Even though these markets all assume fungibility, such an
assumption is "more problematic than it first appears," and efforts to
extend market instruments into new areas often face significant
challenges in developing currencies that facilitate trading while serving as
good overall proxies for environmental quality. 218
In the effort to bring forest carbon into GHG compliance systems,
the currency is well established: GHG emissions, most often quantified in
units of C0 2-equivalent based on the so-called global warming potential
(GWP) of the different gases relative to CO 22 19 The challenge lies in
216. See, e.g., M. Skutsch et al., Clearing the Way for Reducing Emissions from Tropical
Deforestation, 10 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 322, 327 (2007) (discussing accounting challenges
associated with bringing deforestation into climate policy); Ian Noble et al., Implications of
Different Definitions and Generic Issues, in LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY
53-126 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 2000) (providing detailed discussion of major definitional,
accounting, and methodological issues associated with efforts to include land use and forestry in
climate policy).
217. See, e.g., Donald MacKenzie, Making Things the Same: Gases, Emission Rights and the
Politics of Carbon Markets, 34 AcCr., ORGS. & SOC'Y 440, 440 (2009) (analyzing how
commensurability is established between emissions reductions activities and the role of such
commensurability in providing "conditions of possibility" for emerging carbon markets); Michel
Callon, Civilizing Markets: Carbon Trading Between in vitro and in vivo Experiments, 34 ACCr.,
ORGS. & SOC'y 535, 540 (2009) (discussing the establishment and stabilization of "equivalences"
between different greenhouse gases as a critical prerequisite for economic valuation and the
functioning of carbon markets); Peter Levin & Wendy Nelson Espeland, Pollution Futures:
Commensuration, Commodification, and the Market for Air, in ORGANIZATIONS, POLICY, AND
THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONAL AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES (Andrew J.
Hoffman & Marc J. Ventresca eds., 2002) (examining the role of "commensuration" in creating
tradable pollution permits and sustaining market-based approaches to air pollution control).
218. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 30, at 609-15.
219. The GWP concept, which was first articulated in the late 1980s as an analogue to the
"[o]zone-depletion potential" concept used to assess the impacts of different ozone-depleting
substances, was promoted as a tool for comparing the global warming impact of CO2 with non-
CO, greenhouse gases. The IPCC First Assessment Report offered a tentative embrace of the
concept, which soon became the "metric of choice" for comparing the climate impact of GHGs
and provided a key part of the technical foundation for the Kyoto Protocol's embrace of a multi-
gas approach. See Keith P. Shine, The Global Warming Potential: The Need for an
Interdisciplinary Retrial, 96 CLIMATIC CHANGE 467, 467 (2009) [hereinafter Shine, GWP]. The
IPCC First Assessment Report defined the GWP of a particular GHG as "the time integrated
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developing and standardizing the measurement and accounting practices
needed to bring emissions from deforestation into an equivalence with
emissions and removals from other sources and sectors, such that the
avoided emissions from forest protection efforts can be compared to and
ultimately traded with emissions reductions or sequestrations in other
sectors. Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in comparing the
climate impacts of different GHGs,220 the primary concerns that must be
addressed by such an effort are those of leakage, additionality, and non-
permanence. 22' These concerns are particularly challenging in the effort
to bring avoided deforestation into the climate regime, because the
activity that is being credited rests on a counter-factual -emissions
avoided relative to a particular emissions baseline or reference scenario
(the additionality problem)-and because of the difficulties of ensuring
the integrity of such avoided emissions over space (the leakage problem)
and time (the permanence problem).222
In the Kyoto discussions, these concerns provided the technical
grounds for much of the opposition to crediting avoided deforestation
projects under the CDM. 223 Simply put, under the CDM's project-based
accounting, it proved especially difficult to ensure that forest protection
efforts within the project boundary would not simply displace emissions
to areas outside the project boundary, with no net reduction in
emissions.224 Appropriate discounting for such emissions leakage on a
commitment to climate forcing from the instantaneous release of 1 kg of a trace gas expressed
relative to that from 1 kg of carbon dioxide." The report then identified three different time
horizons for evaluating GWPs (twenty, one hundred, and five hundred years). See K.P. Shine et
al., Radiative Forcing of Climate, in CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT:
WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIRST ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 58,60 (J.T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins & J.J.
Ephraums eds., 1990) [hereinafter Radiative Forcing, 1990 IPCC REPORT]. The 100-year time
horizon was selected, "without any clear scientific argumentation," as the basis for the GWP
calculations for the six greenhouse gases regulated under the Kyoto Protocol. Katsumasa
Tanaka et al., Evaluating Global Warming Potentials with Historical Temperature, 96 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 443, 444 (2009) (discussing the GWP concept and the "arbitrariness" of the time
horizon chosen for the GWP as a "fundamental shortcoming"). Obviously, different choices on
time horizons would have generated different equivalences between the different GHGs.
220. See Shine, GWP, supra note 219 (discussing problems of using GWPs as a basis for
comparing the climate impacts of different GHGs); see also Tanaka et al., supra note 219, at
444-47.
221. See definitions of these terms supra notes 102, 103, and 104.
222. See Noble et al., supra note 102, at 83-89 (discussing challenges of leakage and
permanence in context of land use, land-use change, and forestry activities); Brown et al., supra
note 102, at 304-16 (discussing issues of additionality, leakage, and permanence associated with
forest carbon project activities).
223. See supra Part III.B.
224. See Noble et al., supra note 102, at 83-85 (discussing carbon leakage issues associated
with forestry projects); Sandra Brown et al., Issues and Challenges for Forest-Based Carbon-
Offset Projects: A Case Study of the Noel Kempff Climate Action Project in Bolivia, 5
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project-by-project basis would have imposed massive monitoring and
transactions costs, with no clear methodology to account for direct or
indirect emissions leakage? Likewise, non-permanence proved
particularly problematic in the avoided deforestation context because of
the obvious difficulties of ensuring that forest stocks protected under a
particular project would not be deforested in future years.226 And it
appeared to be extremely difficult to ensure that any particular forest
protection project was truly additional.227
The move to REDD since the mid-2000s, however, has been marked
by a concerted effort to develop a new approach to accounting for forest
sector emissions that resolves some of these technical challenges.22
Specifically, the shift toward jurisdiction-wide accounting (primarily at
the national level), which has been made possible by advances in remote
sensing and the ability to map forest cover change over large areas,
combined with a focus on reducing forest sector emissions rather than the
protection of carbon sinks, has placed REDD within (or closer to) an
equivalence space that works for other fossil fuel related emissions, based
on national caps or baselines. 2 9  In contrast to the project-level
accounting advocated in the past under the CDM and currently used in
the voluntary carbon markets, national- and state-level accounting
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 99, 106-10 (2000) (discussing
challenges of mitigating leakage associated with one of the first avoided deforestation projects).
225. See Brown et al., supra note 102, at 316-26 (discussing monitoring, accounting, and
verification challenges associated with land use change and forestry projects).
226. See Noble et al., supra note 102, at 85-86 (discussing permanence challenges associated
with avoided deforestation activities); Ebeling & Yasu6, supra note 106, at 1919 ("Permanence
of emission reductions was a major controversial issue during earlier climate negotiations
regarding the inclusion of forests as carbon sinks in the Kyoto Protocol. The concern was that if
a newly created sink is burnt or logged, the sequestered carbon will be released back into the
atmosphere and there will be no net emission.reduction.").
227. See, e.g., Brown et al., supra note 102, at 304-08 (discussing issues associated with
establishing baselines and assessing additionality for forest carbon project activities); Fearnside,
supra note 107, at 178-79 (discussing challenges of establishing baselines for avoided
deforestation projects under CDM).
228. See supra Part III.C.
229. Efforts within the UNFCCC to expand the scope of REDD to include other forest
carbon activities, such as enhancement and sustainable management of forest carbon stocks,
under the broader umbrella of REDD+, depends upon the development of accounting
frameworks capable of viewing the forest sector as a whole, across the relevant jurisdiction, and
providing an accurate accounting of overall emissions and removals for the different sets of
eligible activities. See, e.g., UNFCCC, Draft Decision -/CP.15, Methodological Guidance for
Activities Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the
Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon
Stocks in Developing Countries, 1 1(d) (2009) (requesting developing country parties to establish
"national forest monitoring systems" using forest carbon inventory approaches "for estimating,
as appropriate, anthropogenic forest-related greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals
by sinks, forest carbon stocks and forest area changes") (footnote omitted).
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frameworks appear to hold a number of advantages and have received
considerable support in REDD policy discussions.2
Most importantly, these jurisdictional accounting frameworks solve,
or greatly reduce, some of the environmental integrity problems
associated with project-based approaches. Thus, under a national
accounting approach, there would be no need to demonstrate
additionality for individual projects given that any reduction in the rate of
deforestation relative to the national baseline or reference scenario
would be deemed additional and, accordingly, eligible for crediting.
Likewise, concerns about project-scale leakage are irrelevant under an
approach that measures reductions in deforestation at a national scale. It
does not matter, in other words, where the emissions reductions come
from under the jurisdictional bubble, as long as the overall rate of
deforestation and the associated emissions decline.
And because REDD is about reducing or avoiding emissions from
the forest sector, it matches up much more directly with efforts to reduce
or avoid emissions in other sectors (such as the combustion of fossil
hydrocarbons to generate electricity or power automobiles), making the
permanence challenge more tractable.23 ' Simply put, a ton of avoided
emissions from reduced deforestation is conceptually identical to a ton of
avoided emissions from reduced fossil fuel use, with the same
permanence issues applying (in theory) in both cases. In the former case,
live carbon is left in the forest reservoir and prevented from leaking into
the atmosphere. In the latter case, dead carbon is left in the geological
reservoir and prevented from leaking into the atmosphere. In both cases,
the permanence of the reduction is tied to the ability to maintain carbon
in the respective biological or geological reservoir over some time
horizon. 232
230. See, e.g., UNFCCC, Views on the Range of Topics and Other Relevant Information
Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries, 11-16, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2 (May 2007), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/
sbstaleng/miscO2.pdf (advocating national baseline approach as basis for REDD accounting);
Waxman-Markey Bill, supra note 125, § 743(e) (identifying national and state level reductions of
deforestation relative to national- or state-level baselines as eligible for international offsets);
CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 127, at 38 (discussing possibility of accepting offsets from
reduced emissions from deforestation "in accordance with appropriate national or sub-national
accounting frameworks").
231. See Michael Dutschke, Fractions of Permanence-Squaring the Cycle of Sink Carbon
Accounting, 7 MMGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 381, 385-94
(2002) (discussing technical approaches to dealing with the permanence issue in afforestation
and reforestation projects under the CDM); Gregg Marland et al., Accounting for Sequestered
Carbon: The Question of Permanence, 4 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 259, 260 (2001) (identifying
"permanence" as the "fundamental issue that is unique to sequestration projects" when
compared to emissions reductions efforts and discussing various proposals to account for
permanence of forest sequestration projects).
232. Noble et al. provide a technical discussion of permanence in the avoided emissions and
sequestration context and note that "the effect of delaying for 1 year a given amount of fossil
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To be sure, the unique biological vulnerabilities of forests 3 relative
to the long-term stability of geological reservoirs of fossil hydrocarbons
suggest a greater vulnerability to future release in the case of forest
carbon. But there are many economic pressures on fossil hydrocarbons,
and a massive techno-economic infrastructure dedicated to extracting
these resources, raising questions about the long-term permanence of
avoided emissions from reductions in fossil fuel burning.2 3 All of which is
simply another way of saying that the widely accepted view that avoided
emissions are necessarily permanent is incorrect. 235 The key point is that
permanence in the avoided emissions context (as opposed to the
sequestration context, whether biological or geological) is an artifact of
the larger emissions policy, that is, whether there is an absolute quantity
constraint on emissions over the relevant time horizon or some other
mechanism(s) for ensuring that avoided carbon emissions stay out of the
atmosphere.23 6  In other words, when the accounting for reduced
emissions from avoided deforestation is done at the national level,
permanence becomes an issue of country performance over time, akin to
performance of any country relative to an emissions cap or baseline in
any other sector or sectors. In this context, the permanence of any
particular stand of forest stocks is not relevant. What matters is that
overall forest sector emissions are under the baseline or cap over the
relevant time period and, if not, that there are effective measures (such as
fuel burning or a given amount of deforestation will be to delay the release of carbon from the
barrels of oil that would be burned or hectares of forest that would be deforested in subsequent
years. To the extent that the emission displacement propagates forward until the end of the time
horizon, the result is a 'permanent' saving." Noble et al., supra note 216, at 85; see also Philip M.
Fearnside et al., Accounting for Time in Mitigating Global Warming Through Land-Use Change
and Forestry, 5 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 239, 240
(2000) (noting that "[clonfusion has often resulted from lumping all LUCF [Land Use Change
and Forestry] activities in a single category as biotic sinks" and asserting that "in the case of
avoiding deforestation in low-latitude regions, the result is more like reducing fossil fuel C
[Carbon] emissions than it is like C sequestration in plantations").
233. See, e.g., Phillips et al., supra note 88, at 1344 (documenting significant carbon release
from the Amazon rainforest during the intense drought of 2005).
234. See Howard Herzog et al., An Issue of Permanence: Assessing the Effectiveness of
Temporary Carbon Storage, 59 CLIMATIC CHANGE 293, 294 (2003) ("[Elconomic considerations
lead one to conclude that a ton of avoided [fossil fuel] emissions today will, absent an absolute
quantity constraint on emissions in all regions through time, mean higher emissions in the
future.").
235. See id. ("[T]he idea that a ton of fossil emissions avoided today is avoided forever is not
necessarily an accurate characterization of the problem because that unburned fossil fuel may
still be mined and burned later.").
236. See id. at 306 ("Permanence or lack thereof of different mitigation options is a function
of the policy regime.. . . If the emissions cap is not global or cannot be maintained in perpetuity,
then emissions reductions today will be subject to temporal leakage . . . ."); see also Fearnside et
al., supra note 232, at 244 ("The cascading effect of displaced emissions depends heavily on the
assumption that the C [Carbon] reserve (either forest or fossil) will last beyond the end of the
time horizon.").
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liability rules, insurance, or credit reserves) in place to compensate for
any reversals and ensure that the atmosphere is made whole.2'
Thus, in moving away from a focus on protecting sinks and crediting
sequestrations at the project level (the Kyoto approach to forests) toward
a policy that credits avoided emissions from reduced deforestation
relative to a national baseline or cap, REDD effectively brings the forest
sector into a much more robust equivalence space with other emissions
reduction efforts. Viewed in this way, the challenge of translating forest
carbon into compliance carbon is fundamentally about finding the right
legal technologies and accounting rules to ensure equivalence with other
emissions reduction efforts over time. By situating forest carbon within a
particular accounting infrastructure, and by bundling reduced emissions
from deforestation with a specific set of legal instruments or technologies
(insurance, liability rules, credit reserves, etc.), things of a different order
(compliance-grade assets) are created, opening up new spaces of
equivalence and new possibilities for regulation. As will be discussed in
Part V, this sort of exercise is endemic to environmental law and operates
as a key knowledge practice aimed at fashioning particular objects of
governance and inserting them into larger regulatory systems.
V. WAYS OF SEEING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The story of how tropical deforestation has become an object of
climate governance illustrates the powerful role that scientific and
technical ways of seeing play in objectifying and framing particular
problems, thereby shaping the possibilities for particular legal and policy
responses. Building on this study, this Part explores some of the broader
implications of such an approach for environmental law, asking at a more
abstract level how the formatting of particular problems shapes the
content of our responses. The discussion is organized around the three
mutually constitutive sets of knowledge practices, or three ways of seeing,
that were instrumental in making tropical deforestation an object of
climate governance: (1) kind-making, (2) calculability, and
(3) equivalence.
A. Kind-Making
The enormous amount of scientific, technical, and institutional work
that has gone into rendering the problem of deforestation
comprehensible for climate governance can be seen as an exercise in
237. See Michael Dutschke & Arild Angelsen, How Do We Ensure Permanence and Assign
Liability?, in MOVING AHEAD wrrH REDD: ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 77 (Arild
Angelsen ed., 2008) (discussing various approaches to permanence in context of REDD).
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global "kind-making" 238 ; that is, an exercise aimed at formatting
deforestation as a particular type of problem, that of carbon
management, amenable to solutions at a particular scale, that of the
planet as a whole, in the context of a particular policy instrument, that of
emissions reductions and trading. This practice of global kind-making, of
course, is evident across a whole range of global problems
(environmental and otherwise). 9
In the environmental field, such global understandings derive
fundamentally from the powerful influence of systems thinking and other
conceptual advances in the post-World War II earth sciences; from new
capabilities of measurement, visualization, modeling, and simulation
(what will be discussed collectively in the next section as new forms and
238. Clark A. Miller, Democratization, International Knowledge Institutions, and Global
Governance, 20 GOVERNANCE 325, 339 (2007) (arguing "that kind-making is a key element in
the emerging authority of international institutions to order global spaces"). Miller borrows the
notion of "kind-making" from philosophers and historians of science, who employ it in an effort
to capture the historical construction and normalization of distinct objects and categories. See,
e.g., IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 125-62 (1999) (discussing kind-
making and its role in creating "child abuse" as a new domain for medical inquiry and
regulation); John Dupr6, Metaphysical Disorder and Scientific Disunity, in THE DISUNITY OF
SCIENCE: BOUNDARIES, CONTEXTS AND POWER 101, 104-06 (Peter Galison & David J. Stump
eds., 1996) (discussing philosophical debates over "natural kinds").
239. See Miller, supra note 238, at 339 (noting that "[r]ecognition of the existence of new
global kinds, such as the ozone layer, the Earth's climate system, or global financial markets, is an
essential feature of globalism and underpins the authority of claims that the management,
regulation, or preservation of these systems requires worldwide cooperation"). Other examples
from the environmental area where new categories or kinds have been constructed at the
intersection of science and law include persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and genetically
modified organisms (GMOs). See Henrik Selin & Noelle Eckley, Science, Politics, and Persistent
Organic Pollutants: The Role of Scientific Assessments in International Environmental
Cooperation, 3 INT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 17, 22-26 (2003) (discussing how
the POPs problem was framed as a specific global kind starting in the late 1980s and the
subsequent traction that the concept has gained in contemporary policy debates); Javier Lezaun,
Creating a New Object of Government: Making Genetically Modified Organisms Traceable, 36
SOC. STUD. SCI. 499, 501-503 (2006) (discussing ways in which specific technical and
administrative practices have allowed GMOs to be rendered "traceable" and, as a result,
amenable to governance across global agro-food systems). Timothy Mitchell's work analyzing
how "the economy" was made into an object that could be investigated and governed is similar
to the notion of "kind-making" advanced here. See, e.g., Timothy Mitchell, The Work of
Economics: How a Discipline Makes Its World, 46 EUR. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 297, 298 (2005)
(describing how "the economy" in its modern sense emerged in the mid-twentieth century as a
result of socio-technical practices which "brought into being a world that for the first time could
be measured and calculated as though it were a free-standing object"); TIMOTHY MITCHELL,
RULE OF EXPERTS: EGYPT, TECHNO-POLITICS, MODERNITY 5 (2002) ("The economy did not
come about as a new name for the processes of exchange that economists had always studied. It
occurred as the reorganization and transformation of those and other processes, into an object
that had not previously existed. The crises and forces that brought about this transformation lay
partly in actions economists had always studied, but for the most part were far wider and more
diverse. These 'extraeconomic' origins of the economy made possible new forms of value, new
kinds of equivalence, new practices of calculation, new relations between human agency and the
nonhuman, and new distinctions between what was real and the forms of its representation.").
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practices of calculability); and from the development of extensive social,
technical, and institutional infrastructures capable of sustaining such
perspectives.24 Think, for example, of the many ways in which climate
science and its infrastructure of "worldwide data collection networks,
computer models, and satellite images" have been instrumental in
constructing the global climate system as "a natural object to be
understood, investigated, and managed on planetary scales."24' None of
which is to say that global climate change is somehow not real or that it is
merely a social construction; rather, it is to say that our understanding of
climate and climate change "has gone from . . . an aggregation of local
weather patterns to . . . an ontologically unitary whole capable of being
understood and managed on scales no smaller than the global itself,"242
and that such an understanding has important implications for law and
governance.
Understanding tropical deforestation as a problem of global carbon
management thus depends upon a conceptual understanding of the
earth's forests as a single, aggregated component of the global carbon
budget, as well as new synoptic infrastructures for coordinating the
240. See Paul N. Edwards, Meteorology as Infrastructural Globalism, 21 OSIRIS 229 (2006)
[hereinafter Edwards, Meteorology as Infrastructural Globalism] (analyzing the development of
global infrastructures for weather observation and meteorology). Edwards also emphasizes the
role of standards in building and maintaining these infrastructures or networks for global
monitoring and assessment. See Paul N. Edwards, "A Vast Machine": Standards as Social
Technology, 304 SCIENCE 827, 827 (2004) ("Behind the emerging consensus on climate change
lie more than 150 years of slow, painful negotiations over global standards for measuring,
recording, and communicating about the weather.").
241. Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards, Introduction: The Globalization of Climate Science
and Climate Politics, in CHANGING THE ATMOSPHERE: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 1, 7 (Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards eds., 2001) (emphasis
omitted). The environmental historian Richard White makes a similar point: "the very ability to
formulate the scales of an environmental issue, either historically or in the present, is a social
product. The current focus on global scale, for example, is not just the result of a correspondence
between actual global environmental problems and scholarly efforts that correctly recognize
them as such . . . . Without a social infrastructure-an international scientific community,
incredibly sensitive measuring instruments, computer modeling, an international popular media
willing and able both to reduce complicated problems to simple slogans and then to repeat them
across the globe, and the ability of humans to move information and themselves quickly around
the planet-global warming or the loss of biodiversity, to cite only two examples, would neither
be recognized as global problems nor have the same potential for spurring historical change."
Richard White, The Nationalization of Nature, 86 J. AM. HIST. 976, 979 (1999).
242. Clark Miller, Climate Science and the Making of a Global Political Order, in STATES OF
KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER 54 (Sheila Jasanoff ed.,
2004). Miller discusses the transformative role played by General Circulation Models (GCM) of
the atmosphere between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s in re-conceptualizing the climate as
"an integrated global system" and in establishing the foundation for the view that "it was the
entire system that was . . . at risk from human emissions of greenhouse gases." Id. at 53-54; see
also Mike Hulme et al., Unstable Climates: Exploring the Statistical and Social Constructions of
'Normal' Climate, 40 GEOFORUM 197, 198 (2009) ("The climatologists and meteorologists of the
19 century using standardized instruments and a series of formal statistical rules ... turned the
idea of climate into something that could be measured and quantified.").
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observation of tropical forests on a planetary scale. This new way of
seeing constitutes an immensely powerful technology of simplification
and legibility "dedicated to specific forms of globalist information "243
(creating new "facts on a planetary scale"'") that are in turn shaping the
content of specific regulatory responses. The effort to construct and
elaborate this way of seeing, which generates a particular understanding
of the world as a whole, underwrites emerging forms of earth systems
governance with significant implications for existing legal regimes
governing forests, land use, and carbon rights.
Of course, the practice of kind-making in environmental law goes far
beyond the global framing of particular problems. Indeed, kind-making is
intimately bound up with basic practices of classification in
environmental law.245 The categories of hazardous wastes, toxic
substances, particular types of air and water pollution, threatened or
endangered species, land cover classifications, and risks of various
degrees of significance, to name only a few obvious examples, all depend
upon elaborate taxonomic work that is rooted in historically situated
scientific and technical ways of seeing. As with all classifications, some of
these efforts are deeply contested and inflected with elaborate political
compromise, while others are rendered invisible, seemingly natural.2"
Beneath these basic regulatory categories, there are many additional
practices of kind-making that sustain the knowledge infrastructure of
environmental law. From the classification of particular diseases to the
elaboration of risk factors for specific populations,247 from the concept of
243. Edwards, Meteorology as Infrastructural Globalsm, supra note 240, at 239.
244. Jasanoff, supra note 152, at 45.
245. Obviously, these practices have relevance beyond the field of environmental law.
246. See GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STARR, SORTING THINGS OUT:
CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 319 (1999) ("Classifications are powerful
technologies. Embedded in working infrastructures they become relatively invisible without
losing any of that power."); DESROSIkRES, supra note 143, at 236 ("Taxonomy is, in a way, the
obscure side of both scientific and political work."). Of course, "forms of classification," to use
the original phrase employed by Durkheim and Mauss, have received considerable attention in
social theory and the sociology of knowledge since the early twentieth century. See EMILE
DURKHEIM AND MARCEL MAUSS, PRIMITIVE CLASSIFICATION (Rodney Needham trans., Univ.
of Chicago Press 1963) (1903) (providing first sociological investigation into certain "primitive
forms of classification"). This Article is particularly interested in how particular forms and
practices of classification shape regulation and governance. See, e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Rethinking
the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, 12 Soc. THEORY 1, 12-13 (1994)
(analyzing "structuring structures," which he compares to Durkheim's "forms of classification,"
as "historically constituted forms" by which "social agents construct the social world" and
emphasizing the central role of the state in the contemporary era in generating and consolidating
particular forms of classification).
247. For a discussion of the history of efforts to develop classification systems for diseases,
including the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), see BOWKER & STARR, supra note
246, at 53-133. See also DESROSItRES, supra note 143, at 272-73 (discussing the origins of efforts
to link certain occupations with particular diseases in order to develop "risk factors" as part of
the larger effort to develop and refine the International Classification of Disease); Charles E.
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threshold dose to the definition of average exposure,m from the idea of
biodiversity to the framework of ecosystem services,249 kind-making and
classification perform enormously important work in environmental law,
establishing the basis for organizing facts and valorizing certain
normative framings that favor particular kinds of approaches. Focusing
on the practice of kind-making and taxonomy generally as an object of
study and investigation, rather than simply accepting them as pre-
established grids or neutral tools, trains attention to the work that goes
into making these classifications and how this shapes the nature and
practice of environmental law.
Discounting these practices as merely "technical" activities that are
somehow subordinate to law and governance misses a great deal. If we
enlarge our field of vision to include the ways in which classification
practices make and remake the world as an object of governance, we can
work toward an understanding of environmental law and governance that
recognizes the deep articulation between seemingly "technical" forms
and practices, on the one hand, and "institutional" practices on the other.
Kind-making matters, and more robust and stable kinds are more
amenable to coherent regulatory solutions.
B. Calculability
If kind-making goes to the ways in which problems are defined as
particular objects of governance, calculability goes to the practices
involved in making them hold together, allowing new problems to be
Rosenberg, Framing Disease: Illness, Society, and History, in FRAMING DISEASE: STUDIES IN
CULTURAL HISTORY xxi (Charles E. Rosenberg & Janet Golden eds., 1992) ("[D]isease
classifications serve to rationalize, mediate, and legitimate relationships between individuals and
institutions in a bureaucratic society.").
248. See, e.g., JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN'S Toxic LEGACY: How SCIENCE AND LAW
FAIL TO PROTECT US FROM PESTICIDES 172 (1998) ("[Alt what dose does a substance change
from harmless, or even health-promoting, to damaging? This deceptively simple question has
become the Achilles' heel of modem U.S. environmental law."). Wargo also discusses the
"simplification of exposure and risk" embedded in the concept of average exposure and its
problematic use in the regulatory sphere. See id. at 219-34.
249. See Takacs, supra note 67, at 74-75 ("Use of the term biodiversity represents greater
sophistication both in how we conceive of conservation and in how we promote broader
conservation goals ... .It is the label for a new, synthetic discipline devoted to conservation. The
word represents a new approach, but not necessarily a new entity: the terms biological diversity,
natural variety, and nature have been around for quite a while. Under the rubric of biodiversity,
these terms are repackaged to unite amorphous, diverse endeavors in a streamlined, do-or-die
conservation effort with biologists at the helm."); Richard Norgaard, Ecosystem Services: From
Eye-Opening Metaphor to Complexity Blinder, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1219, 1219 (2010)
(discussing reductionist "stock-flow" framework that underlies the concept of ecosystem services
and the implications for policy); Erik G6mez-Baggethun et al., The History of Ecosystem
Services in Economic Theory and Practice: From Early Notions to Markets and Payment
Schemes, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1209 (2010) (discussing the history of the ecosystem services
concept and its increasing use as a policy tool).
902 [Vol. 37:843
2010] WAYS OF SEEING 903
seen, understood, and governed-often over vast expanses of space and
time. 50 In the case of deforestation, the effort to make forests an object
of calculation on a global scale has deep historical roots.251  The
quantification of tropical forests as carbon stocks and as components of
the global carbon cycle represents a new round in the ongoing
rationalization and simplification of forest ecosystems. In the context of
REDD, the deployment of remote sensing capabilities and carbon
accounting practices have provided the foundation for visualizing forest
carbon stocks on a global scale-an example of how new mapping and
accounting practices are opening up new possibilities for the
quantification and management of terrestrial carbon.5 2 In the process,
these techniques are paving the way for the application of specific legal
technologies and the creation of new carbon entitlements that work to
de-couple forest carbon from its ecological context and insert it into new,
increasingly global carbon value chains?
250. There is an extensive social science and historical literature on the role of
quantification and its use (and abuse) in government and public policy. This Article finds
inspiration in two different, though not mutually exclusive, approaches to quantification:
quantification as what Theodore Porter calls a "technology of distance" directed primarily at
problems of solving trust and accountability for public officials; and quantification as a
"technology of visibility"-a way of seeing and organizing particular phenomena for
investigation and governance. Compare, e.g., PORTER, supra note 9, at ix (describing
quantification as a "technology of distance" given its capacity to act as a strategy for
communication "that goes beyond the boundaries of locality and community" and that seeks to
"produce knowledge independent of the particular people who make it") with Clark Miller, New
Civic Epistemologies of Quantification, 30 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 403, 425-26 (2005)
(describing quantification as a "technology of visibility" and discussing how new technologies of
visualization "have helped to transform the environment into an entity to be understood,
managed, and governed on scales no smaller than the globe itself'). For a specific discussion of
the role of quantification and its links to accountability in law that draws upon Porter's work, see
Wendy Nelson Espeland & Berit Irene Vannebo, Accountability, Quantification, and Law, 3
ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 21 (2007). Scholars working in the fields of science and technology
studies have also taken measurement and quantification as important objects of inquiry. See, e.g.,
Andrew Barry & Don Slater, Introduction: The Technological Economy, 31 ECON. & SOC'Y 175,
181 (2002) (discussing the importance of "metrology and calculation" in creating "new calculable
objects"); Alexandre Mallard, Compare, Standardize and Settle Agreement: On Some Usual
Metrological Problems, 28 Soc. STUD. SC. 571, 572 (1998) (discussing the "increasing
importance of measurement and precision for society as a whole, not only for scientific practices
but for a society enlightened by the quantifying spirit"). Mallard focuses specifically on what she
refers to as "legal metrology," based on the example of automobile emissions monitoring
systems, as "a special way of coordinating and articulating metrological operations: of purifying
them, making them visible and 'traceable', distributing them to different actors, embodying them
in specific objects and organizations, and tying them up with procedures." Id. at 574.
251. See discussion supra Part II.A.
252. See supra Part IV.B.
253. Recent studies documenting the emergence of new carbon property rights, particularly
in the forest sector, include Samantha Hepburn, Carbon Rights as New Property: The Benefits of
Statutory Verification, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 239 (2009); Takacs, supra note 128; IUCN, supra note
128. See also Levin & Espeland, supra note 217, at 124, 132-33 (analyzing the role of
measurement and calculability-what they refer to as "measurement regimes"-in creating new
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Of course, there are many other examples of how particular practices
of calculation have shaped, and are shaping, environmental law and
governance. The development of standardized measures for various kinds
of pollution, the deployment of new analytical techniques for monitoring
the fate and transport of substances in the environment, probabilistic risk
assessment, biomonitoring, the modeling and simulation of global climate
change, satellite observations of earth system dynamics, and many other
examples all demonstrate how the past, present, and future of
environmental law are deeply bound up with calculative practices of
various kinds-practices that, each in their own way, can be understood
as "technologies of visibility."254 Their role in environmental law and
governance would be difficult to overestimate.
Yet, the standard narrative of environmental law appears to take
such knowledge practices for granted, assuming that they are simply part
of the technical infrastructure that supports, and thus operates largely
prior to, the making of environmental law. As with kind-making and
classification, however, such a view is misplaced. Calculative practices
and the objects that they create and sustain are enormously important in
the making of environmental law and are worthy subjects of investigation
on their own terms. A few examples serve to illustrate.
In their study of water pollution control efforts on the Delaware
River during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Bruce Ackerman and his
colleagues demonstrated how the "pollution problem" was defined and
framed in a manner "susceptible to quantification" by focusing on
dissolved oxygen (DO) as a proxy for water quality.255 Even though DO
is not a particularly useful proxy for overall water quality, it came to
dominate ways of seeing the water pollution problem, contributing to the
resulting policy failures.? As Ackerman and his colleagues argued, "the
use of DO as an index for water quality facilitates a way of thinking about
the pollution problem that is fraught with danger. Once a simple number
is provided as a 'proxy' for water quality, it may take on a life of its own,
tempting all concerned to evaluate alternative programs solely in terms of
the number, without asking more fundamental questions.""' From this,
they drew a cautionary lesson regarding how "facts" get defined and
filtered in environmental policy:
For it was during the process of defining what is to count as a "fact"
that the technocratic effort to chart future policy took the wrong
commodities and providing the technical infrastructure for new environmental markets) (quote
is at 124).
254. Clark Miller, New Civic Epistemologies of Quantification, 30 SC., TECH. & HUM.
VALUES 403, 425-26 (2005).
255. See ACKERMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 18-19.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 28.
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course. While the technocratic intelligence seems to promise to the
lay decision maker a comprehensive assay of the problem to be
confronted, the fact of the matter is that, both because resources are
finite and knowledge imperfect, only certain aspects of the problem
can be approached with suitably "scientific" rigor and decisiveness.
Thus one part of the problem is explored with intensity while other
aspects - of equal or greater importance - are left in limbo. Of course,
a truly comprehensive analysis of the facts is impossible in a
necessarily limited period of time. All this means, however, is that the
most vigorous efforts must be made to insure that the array of "facts"
now known is not confused with the range and kinds of "facts" which
are important for intelligent policy making. 258
One could come up with many other examples of how a particular
proxy-chosen because of its "susceptibility to quantification" -has
driven a particular way of seeing in the context of environmental policy
choices. 259 And yet, this aspect of the work of Ackerman and his
colleagues stands largely as a road not taken in environmental law
scholarship.
Or take the many examples of how particular analytical techniques
have shaped basic approaches to the understanding and regulation of
toxic substances in the environment. From early efforts to trace the
spread of radionuclides and synthetic organic compounds such as PCBs
and DDT in the environment,2 6 to the refinement and widespread
258. Id. at 30.
259. Think, for example, of the use of ambient concentrations of certain air pollutants as a
proxy for human health impacts under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
program; the use of "excess cancer deaths" as a shorthand way of determining acceptable risk at
hazardous waste sites; or the many ways that risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses of
various kinds employ proxies susceptible to quantification and monetization. Numerous
examples also come to mind from the conservation and natural resources fields, from the use of
specific ecological indicators of various types as proxies for ecosystem integrity to the use of
acreage as a "surrogate" for the environmental services provided by wetlands in wetlands
mitigation. See, e.g., Virginia H. Dale & Suzanne C. Beyeler, Challenges in the Development and
Use of Ecological Indicators, 1 ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS 3, 5 (2001) (discussing problems
associated with use of ecological indicators in facilitating narrow, oversimplified management
programs); Vincent Carignan & Marc-Andr6 Villard, Selecting Indicator Species to Monitor
Ecological Integrity: A Review, 78 ENVTL. MONITORING & ASSESSMENT 45, 50-52 (2002)
(reviewing problems associated with the use of indicator species to monitor ecological integrity);
Royal C. Gardner, Mitigation, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION
404, at 263 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005) (noting that "[w]here site-specific data are
lacking, the Corps may use acreage 'as a reasonable surrogate for no net loss of functions and
values') (citation omitted).
260. See, e.g., George M. Woodwell, Toxic Substances and Ecological Cycles, 216 SC. AM.
24, 24 (1967) (discussing contributions of radioactive fallout studies to understanding "global,
long-term ecological processes that concentrate toxic substances" in the environment); David B.
Peakall & Jeffrey L. Lincer, Polychlorinated Biphenyls: Another Long-Life Widespread
Chemical in the Environment, 20 BIOSCIENCE 958 (1970) (describing techniques for measuring
presence of PCBs in various environmental media and animal tissues); S. Jensen et al., DDT and
PCB in Marine Animals from Swedish Waters, 224 NATURE 247 (1969) (discussing early efforts
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deployment of gas chromatography-mass spectrometry in the 1970s as a
tool for assessing the presence of contaminants in various environmental
media,261 specific analytical techniques have made it possible to approach
toxics in the environment as an object of regulation. More recently, the
dramatic increase in detection limits made possible by new sampling
techniques (down to the parts per trillion level and beyond), combined
with increased use of biomonitoring, has made visible trace amounts of
chemicals in human tissues and the environment, often challenging
prevailing assumptions -whether dioxin contamination discovered in the
effluent of pulp and paper mills in the mid-1980s,262 perchlorate
contamination of groundwater from rocket fuel facilities in the late
1990s,263 or the recently discovered presence in human and animal tissues
of perfluorinated compounds used in various stain-resistant products,
brominated compounds used as flame retardants, and bisphenol-A used
in a variety of plastics, resins, and sealants.2" Such techniques, which
have provided radically enhanced ways of visualizing the fate and
transport of chemicals in the environment and their presence in human
populations, often exceed basic understandings of the possible harms of
to identify presence of PCBs in animal tissues); George M. Woodwell et al., DDT in the
Biosphere: Where Does it Go?, 174 SCIENCE 1101 (1971) (describing how global modeling
permits appraisal of the hazards of DDT residues in the biosphere); H.L. Harrison et al., Systems
Studies of DDT Transport, 170 SCIENCE 503 (1970) (discussing development and application of
systems model for understanding long-term impacts of DDT in ecosystems).
261. See WILLIAM L. BUDDE, ANALYTICAL MASS SPECTROMETRY: STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RELATED APPLICATIONS 5-11 (2001) (describing deployment of the
first gas chromatography-mass spectrometry machines in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which
underwrote substantial increases in capabilities for identifying the presence of organic
contaminants in various environmental media, leading to new regulatory approaches).
262. See William Boyd, Controlling Toxic Harms: The Struggle Over Dioxin Contamination
in the Pulp and Paper Industry, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 345, 359-61 (2002) (describing
development of new analytical techniques in mid-1980s that revealed relatively high dioxin
concentrations in waters previously identified as "background" streams).
263. See William E. Motzer, Perchlorate: Problems, Detection, and Solutions, 2 ENVTL.
FORENSICS 301, 302 (2001) (describing development of new analytical techniques by the
California Department of Health Services during the late 1990s that improved perchlorate
detection limits by some two orders of magnitude, revealing perchlorate "in water sources not
previously suspected of being contaminated").
264. See, e.g., John L. Butenhoff et al., The Applicability of Biomonitoring Data for
Perfluorooctanesulfonate to the Environmental Public Health Continuum, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 1776, 1777 (2006) (discussing development of biomonitoring techniques since late 1990s
that have uncovered widespread distribution of perfluorinated compounds in humans and
wildlife); Linda S. Birnbaum & Elaine A. Cohen Hubal, Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers: A
Case Study for Using Biomonitoring to Address Risk Assessment Questions, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 1770, 1771 (2006) (discussing use of biomarkers for assessing exposure to
polybrominated diphenyl ethers, or PBDEs); Antonia M. Calafat et al., Urinary Concentrations
of Bisphenol A and 4-Nonylphenol in a Human Reference Population, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 391, 393 (2005) (finding widespread human exposure to bisphenol-A).
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exposure. 26 5 At the same time, however, they have prepared the ground
for and called forth new ecological understandings of toxic substances
that emphasize interconnections and persistence, opening up new spaces
for regulation.26
The construction and elaboration of monitoring and surveillance
systems also demonstrate how practices of calculability and the creation
of specific infrastructures organize and stabilize particular objects of
environmental governance. Efforts to control acid rain, for example,
depended fundamentally upon the development of standardized
monitoring techniques and the construction of acid rain monitoring
networks in Europe and the United States that allowed the problem to be
defined as one of regional rather than local concern. 267 Likewise, the
development of continuous emissions monitoring systems (CEMS)
provided the basis for the particular policy response of emissions trading
265. See JOSEPH V. RODRICKS, CALCULATED RISKS: THE ToxICITY AND HUMAN HEALTH
RISKS OF CHEMICALS IN OUR ENVIRONMENT 208 (1992) ("Our ability to detect chemicals in the
environment bears no relationship whatsoever to the degree of risk they pose.").
266. See, e.g., Arthur Daemmrich, Risk Frameworks and Biomonitoring: Distributed
Regulation of Synthetic Chemicals in Humans, 13 ENVTL. HIST. 684, 685 (2008) (arguing that
biomonitoring capabilities are driving changes in conceptions of risk and basic norms governing
chemicals regulation); Richard Albertini et al., The Use of Biomonitoring Data in Exposure and
Human Health Risk Assessments, 114 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1755, 1756 (2006) ("Improved
analytical capabilities make possible the accurate and precise measurement of many
environmental chemicals at very low levels in the tissues of the general population, thus
demonstrating human exposure to and absorption of chemicals, and often their distribution,
metabolism, storage, and elimination."). George Woodwell provided an early (and prescient)
analysis of how new capabilities for monitoring and assessing the fate and transport of toxic
substances in ecological systems altered our ways of seeing the environment. See Woodwell,
supra note 260, at 24 ("Over the past decade detailed studies of the distribution of both
radioactive debris and pesticides have revealed patterns that have surprised even biologists long
familiar with the unpredictability of nature."); see also Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection
in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 156-57 (2004) ("Breakthroughs in
nanotechnologies and small-scale sensors, however, have begun to provide a vastly improved
ability to detect and measure pollutants at a fine-grained level. Similarly, remote sensing from
satellites in space and other new macroscale sensor technologies appear poised to provide on-
the-ground monitoring of environmental conditions from anywhere, at any time, at increasingly
low cost. We thus are approaching the day when virtually all emissions will be susceptible to
tagging, tracking, and measurement at relatively low cost.").
267. See William C. Clark et al., Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion, and Climate Change: An
Historical Overview, in 1 LEARNING TO MANAGE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: A
COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF SOCIAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION,
AND ACID RAIN 30-31 (Social Learning Group eds., 2001) (discussing development of
European Air Chemistry Network in mid-1940s and its role in providing the foundation for
efforts to understand and approach acid rain as a large-scale, regional phenomenon); Stephen
Zehr, Method, Scale, and Socio- Technical Networks: Problems of Standardization in Acid Rain,
Ozone Depletion, and Global Warming Research, 7 SCI. STUD. 47, 47-49 (1994) (discussing
development of an acid rain monitoring network in the United States and its implications for
policy approaches to the problem). Advances in air pollution modeling were also important in
conceptualizing acid rain as a specific object of governance. See David W. Cash et al., Knowledge
Systems for Sustainable Development, 100 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 8086, 8089 (2003) (discussing
role of RAINS model in framing problem of acid rain as an object of governance).
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by ensuring a degree of accuracy and standardization in measuring sulfur
dioxide (SO,) emissions needed for the SO, trading market.2" In the case
of stratospheric ozone depletion, the move from a ground-based
monitoring network to satellite-based observation in the late 1960s and
1970s provided a previously unavailable synoptic view of ozone depletion
and atmospheric dynamics, allowing the problem to be framed as one of
global scope and concern.269 And, of course, in the case of global climate
change, the massive and continually growing network of ground- and
space-based monitoring capabilities, some of which have been built up
over more than a century, are instrumental in creating our basic
understanding of global climate conditions and in establishing the key
proxies, such as global average surface temperature, that we use to assess
and calibrate such understandings.270
Of the many ways that practices of calculation have shaped
environmental law by creating and sustaining new objects of governance,
however, few are as important in the current period as modeling and
simulation. From basic applications in the various scientific disciplines
that support environmental law (whether in ecology, environmental
engineering, epidemiology, or the earth sciences) to specific policy-
oriented applications (such as the behavior of geological repositories
268. See Levin & Espeland, supra note 217, at 132 ("Trading emissions requires that buyers
and sellers see pollution as standardized units of some scarce resource. The shift in units of
analysis from rates to aggregate pollution, which was crucial for creating this conception of
pollution, was accomplished largely through the development of a rigorous emissions monitoring
system. The EPA was primarily responsible for designing and implementing this 'continuous
emissions monitoring system' (CEMS)."); Paul D. Brown, Lofty Goals, Questioned Motives, and
Proffered Justifications: Regional Transport of Ground-Level Ozone and the EPA's NOx SIP
Call, 60 U. Prrr. L. REV. 923, 967 (1999) ("CEMS [continuous emissions monitoring systems]
provide a degree of certainty that the commodity sought actually exists. It protects the would-be
purchaser from transacting for 'phantom' allowances.").
269. See EARTH OBSERVATIONS FROM SPACE, supra note 180, at 38-39 (noting
"rudimentary view" of stratospheric ozone distribution provided by ground-based instruments in
the "pre-satellite era" compared to the "revolutionized" understanding of atmospheric
dynamics, and stratospheric ozone in particular, made possible by satellite instruments);
STEPHEN 0. ANDERSEN & K. MADHAVA SARMA, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: THE
UNITED NATIONS HISTORY 5-19 (2002); Zehr, supra note 267, at 48; SETH CAGIN & PHILIP
DRAY, BETWEEN EARTH AND SKY: How CFCs CHANGED OUR WORLD AND ENDANGERED
THE OZONE LAYER 262-76 (1993).
270. A moment's reflection on the concept of average global surface temperature makes
apparent the tremendous challenges involved in constructing such a measure, requiring the
development, elaboration, and calibration of extensive observation networks across the planet
and through time and the synthesis of enormous amounts of data. See IPCC WG I REPORT,
supra note 159, at 102 ("Despite the fact that many recent observations are automatic, the vast
majority of data that go into global surface temperature calculations-over 400 million
individual readings of thermometers at land stations and over 140 million individual in situ SST
[sea surface temperature] observations-have depended on the dedication of tens of thousands
of individuals for well over a century.. . . [C]entury-scale global temperature time series would
not have been possible without the conscientious work of individuals and organizations
worldwide dedicated to quantifying and documenting their local environment.").
2010] WAYS OF SEEING 909
targeted for long-term storage of radioactive waste, the spread of air
pollution from industrial facilities, or the response of the global climate to
various emissions scenarios, to name only a few), modeling and
simulation provide access to previously invisible phenomena (and to the
future) in ways that are simply not possible with traditional techniques of
experimentation and observation. Within earth systems science,
simulation models, such as the increasingly powerful General Circulation
Models (GCMs) used to model global climate change,27 ' provide a new
way of seeing "systems that are too large, too complex, or too far away to
study by other means."272 II many respects, modeling and simulation,
together with satellite-based remote sensing and other forms of global
observation, represent the triumph of systems theory in the earth sciences
during the post-World War II period, allowing for the creation of new
objects of knowledge such as global climate change, and underwriting
new forms of global environmental governance.273
271. See PAUL N. EDWARDS, A VAST MACHINE: COMPUTER MODELS, CLIMATE DATA,
AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL WARMING 139-86, 337-55 (2010) (discussing historical
development of GCMs and their implications for knowledge about the climate system); Leo J.
Donner & William G. Large, Climate Modeling, 33 ANN. REV. ENV'T & RES. 1 (2008)
(reviewing current state of climate modeling); HERVt LE TREUT ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: WORKING GROUP I
CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 112-18 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (providing overview of the
development of climate modeling and the increased complexity and resolution made possible by
advances in computational capacity).
272. Oreskes, supra note 9, at 70-71; see also Amy Dahan Dalmedico, History and
Epistemology of Models: Meteorology (1946-1963) as a Case Study, 55 ARCH. HIST. EXACr SCI.
395 (2001) (tracing the rise of innovative modeling practices in post-World War II meteorology
to the deployment of increasingly powerful computational technologies-marking a broader
shift in the study of earth systems from mathematization to modeling). On simulations, see Peter
J. Galison, Computer Simulations and the Trading Zone, in THE DISUNITY OF SCIENCE:
BOUNDARIES, CONTEXT, AND POWER 118 (Peter Galison & Donald J. Stump eds., 1996)
(discussing history of the Monte Carlo simulation and its epistemic implications); Eric Winsberg,
Sanctioning Models: The Epistemology of Simulation, 12 SCI. IN CONTEXT 275, 276 (1999)
(describing simulation as "a form of calculation," but with its own unique epistemology). On the
use of Monte Carlo simulations in environmental risk assessment, see Susan R. Poulter, Monte
Carlo Simulation in Environmental Risk Assessment-Science, Policy, and Legal Issues, 9 RISK:
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENv'T7 (1998).
273. The fundamental importance of models in environmental law and governance has not
escaped environmental law scholars, although few have sought to place these practices within
their historical context and understand, with reference to the vast literature on modeling, the
kinds of knowledge claims made possible by such practices and the concomitant implications for
governance. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and its Impacts: Law, Policy,
and Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1698 (2008) (providing a general overview of climate models
and noting the importance of understanding the uncertainties and limits associated with such
models); James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts between Models
and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 912-13 (2005)
("Models can organize, manipulate, and process vast quantities of data and can simulate
complex multivariable processes, and these capacities allow them to predict the future, compare
alternative possible futures, test the ramifications of assumptions, and contribute to improved
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But there are limits embedded within all of these calculative
practices. Predictive models, for example, operate as "a surrogate for
access to the future," but it is very difficult to evaluate "how good a
surrogate they are."274 These models, in other words, provide a tool for
rendering certain futures visible, establishing a basis for policy choices,
but we have no way of knowing how partial this visibility is. Likewise,
there are problems of false precision attending any effort to quantify
particular phenomena. 27 5 And there are fundamental issues that go to the
manner in which these practices of calculation and the resulting ways of
seeing render certain aspects of a problem less visible. To take one
example, in the case of the "ozone hole" discovered over Antarctica in
the mid-1980s, the prior move to satellite-based observations and the
corresponding global view of stratospheric ozone depletion led directly to
the practice of discarding certain satellite data suggesting severe
depletion over Antarctica for several years based on erroneous
assumptions of "instrument failure," because the readings were outside
the expected "normal" range and did not comport with the prevailing
understanding of ozone depletion as a uniform, global process. 276 The
understanding of stratospheric ozone depletion as a global problem, in
other words, made it more difficult to see a particularly vital aspect of the
problem.
Finally, as numerous scholars have emphasized in multiple contexts,
the very act of rendering something objective and calculable is a way of
making it technical, thereby taking it out of the world of politics and
social institutions.277 In the effort to make deforestation a unitary object
of climate governance, the act of reducing the forest to its embodied
carbon and its functional role in the global carbon cycle takes
understanding of system interactions."); Thomas 0. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Legal
Aspects of Regulatory Use of Environmental Modeling, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10751 (2003)
(providing an overview of key issues arising in substantive judicial review of EPA modeling and
discussing key challenges to the use of models in regulatory decision making); Charles D. Case,
Problems in Judicial Review Arising from the Use of Computer Models and Other Quantitative
Methodologies in Environmental Decision Making, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 251 (1982)
(reviewing increasing use of quantitative models in environmental decision making and the
implications for judicial review).
274. See, e.g., Oreskes, supra note 9, at 79 (discussing the inability to evaluate and confirm
model predictions regarding behavior thousands of years in the future, such as that of high-level
nuclear waste repositories).
275. See id. at 81 ("Modeling may lead to greater rigor in the evaluation of earth processes,
but it may also propagate the illusion that things are better known than they really are."); Sheila
Jasanoff & Brian Wynne, Science and Decision Making, in 1 HUM. CHOICE & CLIMATE
CHANGE 62 (pointing out that although models are often seen as "tools and heuristics" by the
modeling community, they are often perceived and presented as "truth machines" in the policy
community).
276. See CAGIN & DRAY, supra note 269, at 270; Jasanoff & Wynne, supra note 275, at 32-
33.
277. See ROSE, supra note 11; FERGUSON, supra note 11; SCOrr, supra note 11.
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deforestation out of its many social, political, and institutional contexts
and inserts it into a project of global environmental governance. A set of
phenomena deeply embedded within particular circumstances is re-
formatted as a singular problem of global carbon management. But
unless this global project can somehow be re-inserted into these different
contexts in a workable fashion, through the elaboration of specific legal
and institutional forms in particular places, it will almost certainly fail,
regardless of how accurately one can calculate the carbon embodied in
tropical forests.
C. Equivalence
Equivalence is about making things of a different order, creating a
basis for common measurement and evaluation. It is a form of technical
and regulatory alchemy aimed at establishing commensurability -a
practice that is similar to but broader than that of choosing a "currency"
to ensure fungibility in environmental trading markets.2 78 As a way of
seeing oriented toward organizing and standardizing practices of
calculation and kind-making, equivalence provides the basis for inserting
these practices into larger regulatory architectures. This notion of
equivalence borrows from recent work in social and economic theory
directed at the construction of particular conventions of equivalence as a
basis for statistical reasoning2 79 and at the use of particular forms of
equivalence in solving coordination problems in the context of economic
activities and the construction of markets.2' By taking coordination as
problematic, these perspectives direct attention to the general modes,
devices, and technologies used to create common frameworks for action.
Understood in this way, technologies of equivalence are endemic in
environmental law and governance, as well as other fields, and merit
investigation on their own terms as important knowledge practices that
278. Cf Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 30.
279. See DESROSIPRES, supra note 143, at 104-05 (discussing the importance of conventions
of equivalence in the development of national statistical traditions and the role of these
conventions in "creating contexts of common measurement").
280. See, e.g., Laurent Th6venot, Organized Complexity: Conventions of Coordination and
the Composition of Economic Arrangements, 4 EUR. J. Soc. THEORY 405, 407 (2001) (exploring
different ways of creating equivalence between people or things in order to resolve economic
coordination problems). The challenge of establishing equivalence is particularly apparent in the
effort to construct markets for emissions and other environmental commodities. See, e.g., Levin
& Espeland, supra note 217, at 133-34 ("The fungibility of pollutants as commodities hinged on
people's faith that one ton of SO, in Chicago was really equal to a ton of SO, in New York.
Standardized measures help produce these equivalencies and help reassure traders and
regulators alike of the legitimacy of this equivalency. The technical commensuration
accomplished in this synchronization of software, hardware, and bureaucratic rule-making
transformed smoke from smokestacks into a meticulously tracked quantity."); MacKenzie, supra
note 217, at 440 (analyzing the "conditions of possibility of these [carbon markets], by examining
... what it takes to make the entities traded in these markets 'the same').
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shape the field by bringing various phenomena and practices into
common evaluative schemes.
Thus, the standardization of particular measures and protocols for
environmental monitoring and control provides one obvious example of
the role that equivalence technologies play in environmental
regulation. 281 But there are many other examples, some less obvious, that
play equally fundamental coordinative roles in the construction of ever
more elaborate systems of environmental regulation. In the climate
change context, for example, the development of the GWP concept,
together with accounting standards, registries, and emissions inventories,
operates as a powerful equivalence machine, allowing different emissions
reduction and sequestration activities across different sectors, and
involving different gases with different climate impacts, to be compared,
standardized, and tracked in a manner that, at least in theory, creates the
possibility for a comprehensive multi-sector, multi-gas compliance
system.82 With respect to the effort to bring deforestation into climate
policy, the move to jurisdiction-wide accounting practices and the
application of particular legal tools and standards to deal with leakage,
permanence, and additionality have all worked to create an equivalence
space for translating forest carbon into compliance carbon.23
In other areas of environmental law, equivalence practices of various
kinds provide a basis for placing different activities and phenomena
within a common regulatory framework. Thus, the creation of particular
"currencies" provides a means for dealing with fungibility problems in
281. See PORTER, supra note 11, at 27-28 (discussing development of standards for
measuring pollutants in the environment, a process that "means disciplining people as well as
standardizing instruments and processes" and developing "specifications [that] must be put into
effect at millions of diverse locations, by calibrating millions of instruments and millions of
people to the same standard").
282. On the GWP concept, see the discussion supra note 219. The IPCC First Assessment
Report, which introduced the GWP concept as a possible tool for dealing with different
greenhouse gases in climate policy, noted the difficulties of using this tool as an equivalence
technique. See Radiative Forcing, 1990 IPCC REPORT, supra note 219, at 58 ("In considering the
policy options for dealing with greenhouse gases, it is necessary to have a simple means of
describing the relative abilities of emissions of each greenhouse gas to affect radiative forcing
and hence climate . . . . It must be stressed that there is no universally accepted methodology for
combining all the relevant factors into a single global warming potential for greenhouse gas
emissions. In fact there may be no single approach which will represent all the needs of
policymakers."). And yet, the climate policy process has established the GWP as the basis for
making greenhouse gases commensurable in existing and emerging compliance systems,
illustrating the strong regulatory push for equivalence and the durability of particular
conventions of equivalence. For technical assessments of the GWP concept, including its
shortcomings, see Shine, supra note 219; Tanaka et al., supra note 219. See also MacKenzie,
supra note 217, at 445-46 (describing the development of the GWP concept and its "inscription"
into the Kyoto Protocol as a "black-box" for making greenhouse gases "commensurable").
MacKenzie also notes the importance of accounting standards and practices in "mak[ing] carbon
'fungible"' and, thus, amenable to trading. Id. at 447.
283. See supra Part IV.C.
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environmental trading marketsM The use of dose-response curves and
model organisms to extrapolate from high-dose to low-dose exposures
and from animals to humans provide an equivalence space for setting
regulatory standards and comparing toxic substances.28 The concepts of
emissions bubbles and offsets represent, in an almost literal sense, the
very embodiment of equivalence. More generally, the practices of
comparative risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis are founded on the
drive toward a common metric, most often that of human lives and/or
money, for comparing and evaluating tradeoffs among different
activities."
284. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 30, at 613-14; Levin & Espeland, supra note 217, at
133-34.
285. See DONALD G. CROSBY, ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY AND CHEMISTRY 143-53
(1998) (discussing use of dose-response relationship and animal bioassays in toxicology).
286. See, e.g., John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in
RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 33 (John D.
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (discussing challenges of comparing certain kinds
of risks, but noting that "it is chiefly our lack of methods of comparison-of ways of seeing
commonality among these risks-that makes these risks seem 'dissimilar' or noncomparable, not
an inherent incommensurability"); SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 6-7 (discussing rise of cost-
benefit analysis in U.S. environmental regulation and its "cognitive" virtues in providing a basis
for comparing alternative courses of action); PORTER, supra note 9, at 186-89 (discussing the
historical transformation of cost-benefit analysis from a tool used by engineers to evaluate public
works projects into a "universal standard of rationality" for evaluating a whole host of
government expenditures and regulatory activities). Echoing Marx's famous observations on the
role of money as the universal equivalent, Michel Callon describes the central role of money in
constructing equivalences and ensuring commensurability in these sorts of exercises. See Michel
Callon, Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics, in THE LAWS OF
THE MARKETS 21-22 (Michel Callon ed., 1998) ("[Money] makes commensurable that which
was not so before. The case of negative externalities, for example the effects of pollution
produced by a chemical plant, clearly illustrates this point. Once identified and acknowledged,
[the externality], if it is to be framed and thus internalized, has to be measured . . . . This
measuring involves the establishment of a metrology, anchored in techno-scientific instruments,
which enables the agents concerned to establish quantitative correspondences between a cause
(eg, the discharge of dioxin) and an injury (eg, a probability of cancer). This correlation between
a risk of death and the activity of a factory, established by means of laboratory experiments and
epidemiological research, creates a link between two distinct series of events. But if the
relationship (between a discharge and deaths) becomes calculable by the agents, it is not enough
merely to prove its existence; it has to be expressed in the same units. This is where money
comes in. It provides the currency, the standard, the common language which enables us to
reduce heterogeneity, to construct an equivalence and to create a translation between a few
molecules of a chemical substance and human lives. Money comes in last in a process of
quantification and production of figures, measurements and correlations of all kinds. It is the
final piece, the keystone in a metrological system that is already in place and of which it merely
guarantees the unity and coherence. Alone it can do nothing; combined with all the
measurements preceding it, it facilitates a calculation which makes commensurable that which
was not so before: grams of dioxin and a human life. Thanks to it the agents can measure the
investments required to reduce the risk of death below a certain threshold. Money establishes an
ultimate equivalence between the value of a human life and that of investment in pollution
abatement.").
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In each of these cases, it is important to understand how specific
technologies of equivalence have evolved within the larger framework of
environmental law and the nature of the work they do. To be sure, there
is a certain violence associated with the simplifications-quite radical in
some cases-entailed by these different technologies of equivalence, a
fact that has sometimes provoked a strong normative reaction against
their application in areas affecting human health and the environment.8
And there is little question that particular conventions of equivalence
have a certain durability or permanence (what some might call path
dependence) that may have less to do with their overall efficacy or
validity from a particular technical or normative standpoint than with the
substantial political, economic, and cognitive investments that have gone
into establishing and holding them together.' By taking conventions of
equivalence as objects of investigation on their own terms, by exploring
how they work to construct things of a different order, and by seeking to
generalize about the different forms and modes of equivalence at work in
environmental law, the intent is not to discount the importance of
normative debates regarding their use or abuse, but rather to develop our
understanding of the capabilities and limits of particular conventions of
equivalence in particular contexts. As we develop more expansive
environmental regulatory systems, some with truly global reach,
equivalence becomes much more challenging, though no less important,
in the effort to facilitate interoperability between different systems and
across jurisdictions. By taking the problem of coordination head on and
focusing on the role of different equivalence practices in structuring the
way we see and approach environmental problems, we open up a whole
new range of questions regarding how these ways of seeing shape and
define the conditions of possibility for particular strategies of
287. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (criticizing widespread
application of cost-benefit analysis in evaluating environmental, health, and safety regulations);
Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, supra note 29,
at 562-89 (discussing key limitations of cost-benefit analysis in the climate change context).
288. In his fascinating history of statistical reasoning, Alain Desrosibres discusses the
"extremely expensive political, social, and technical investments" necessary to produce "the
conventions of equivalence and permanence of the objects on which statistical practice is based."
See DESROSIt-RES, supra note 143, at 337. Desrosibres rejects what he refers to as the "dead-
ended epistemological opposition" between realism and relativism, asserting that statistical
objects, such as poverty or unemployment, are both real and constructed. See id. History thus
provides the means for understanding how these objects came to be, how they were made to
hold together, and how they are severed from their contexts, naturalized, and allowed to
circulate as objective facts in public debate. Viewing statistics in this manner serves to reveal the
relationship between statistics and the public sphere, helping to "clarify and analyze these spaces
of durably solidified forms, which must simultaneously remain undebated so that life may follow
its course, and debatable, so that life can change its course." See id.
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environmental law and governance across multiple geographies and
publics.
CONCLUSION
In a 1998 policy editorial in Science, the Terrestrial Carbon Working
Group of the International Geosphere Biosphere Program offered an
assessment of the effort to account for terrestrial carbon under the
recently adopted Kyoto Protocol.289 After reviewing the complex
treatment of carbon sinks under Kyoto and the ongoing efforts to
develop carbon accounting methodologies, the group concluded that
"[e]ventually, all terrestrial ecosystems, both managed and unmanaged,
should be included [in carbon accounting systems] to recognize and
potentially increase all terrestrial sinks, to minimize sources, and to avoid
the surprise of large unanticipated releases of carbon from unmanaged
systems."2 9 In many ways, the editorial summed up the vision of an
emerging program aimed at earth systems governance and built around
the idea that the entire global terrestrial carbon cycle could be made into
a viable object of climate governance.291
The emergence of REDD since 2005 can be seen as the first tangible
effort to bring a major component of the terrestrial carbon cycle, tropical
deforestation, into a global environmental governance regime. But the
story of how deforestation became (and is becoming) an object of climate
governance cannot be understood without attending to the manner in
which scientific and technological ways of seeing have formatted the
problem in a manner amenable to climate policy. Based on advances in
post-World War II carbon cycle research, the deployment of increasingly
powerful remote sensing capabilities, and the development of legal and
accounting techniques for rendering forest carbon equivalent to other
forms of compliance carbon, a set of phenomena previously viewed
through the lens of biodiversity loss, North-South linkages, macro-
economic imbalances, and governance failures of various kinds has been
(and continues to be) reduced, simplified, and reformatted in a manner
that is comprehensible for climate mitigation efforts in general and
emerging GHG compliance systems in particular.
Viewing this as simply another step toward a more fundamental
understanding of the "underlying" problem of deforestation misses the
fact that this is a problem that has no single essence or identity waiting to
289. See Int'l Geosphere-Biosphere Program Terrestrial Carbon Working Group, The
Terrestrial Carbon Cycle: Implications for the Kyoto Protocol, 280 SCIENCE 1393 (1998).




be discovered, but rather a diverse range of phenomena that have to be
organized into a coherent object of investigation and governance. It also
misses the important normative observation that these new ways of
seeing represent a radical simplification of complex social and biological
systems, providing the basis for a new abstraction-forest carbon-that,
in turn, prepares the way for the application of particular legal
technologies and new forms of property that are pulling tropical forests,
and the many people who depend on them, into a regulatory regime that
is global in scope and premised on the possibility of de-coupling forest
carbon from forest ecosystems. Ways of seeing are, in this way and
others, intimately bound up with particular ways of acting on the world.
By asking how scientific and technological ways of seeing shape the
subject matter of environmental law, we gain a new and deeper
understanding of the nature and limits-the conditions of possibility-of
governance as well as the durability, or stickiness, of particular forms of
governance. Few areas of law are as deeply implicated with science and
technology as environmental law, and yet we have no theory of how the
knowledge practices of science and technology shape the field. Exploring
the specific knowledge practices of kind-making, calculability, and
equivalence provides a first step toward a possible larger effort to
investigate how objects of governance are made and, in the process, how
particular dimensions or aspects of the underlying phenomena are
foregrounded, backgrounded, or left out altogether in the elaboration of
specific regulatory regimes. A mature environmental law, together with a
mature environmental law scholarship, needs to look closely (and
critically) at how we see and at how ways of seeing shape and inform the
substance of environmental law.
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